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ARTICLES
Redundant Public-Private
Enforcement
Zachary D. Clopton*
Redundancy is a four-letter word. According to courts and scholars,
redundant litigation is costly, unfair, and confounding. Modern civil procedure
has a (nearly) maximalist preference for centralization, and various rules seek
to limit duplicative suits within and across court systems. This seemingly
dominant view stands in marked contrast to the reality of the modern regulatory
state. Redundant public-private enforcement, in which public and private
actors have overlapping authority to enforce the law, is ubiquitous. Redundant
enforcement also is noticeably underrepresented in the substantial literature on
private and public enforcement, which typically treats government agencies and
private attorneys general as substitutes rather than complements.
This Article seeks to fill these gaps. It begins with a survey of the myriad
forms of redundant enforcement in U.S. law, and then turns to a defense of
redundant public-private enforcement. Scholars of engineering and public
administration have built up a powerful literature on the potential uses of
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redundancy, and this Article applies those insights to overlapping public and
private enforcement in U.S. law. Drawing on those literatures, this Article
derives principles of redundant enforcement that account for the diversity of
agents and the potential for strategic behavior. It argues that redundancy may
be an effective response to errors, resource constraints, information problems,
and agency costs, if redundant-enforcement regimes harness multiple diverse
agents and are tailored to the relevant regulatory environment. Specifically, if
the lawmaker worries that public or private agents are missing good cases,
redundant authority may help to reduce errors, increase resources, aggregate
information, and improve monitoring—though permitting duplicative suits
may undercut these gains. Meanwhile, if the lawmaker is concerned about
under-enforcing settlements or judgments, symmetrically non-preclusive
redundant litigation may be a valuable tool—though damages should offset to
avoid multiple punishments, and procedural rules should maintain incentives
and allocate cases.
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REDUNDANT PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Chief Justice Roberts: “[W]hat prevents attorneys general from around the country sitting
back and waiting until . . . the plaintiffs’ class prevails, taking the same complaint, maybe
even hiring the same lawyers, to go and say, ‘Well, now we are going to bring our parens
patriae action, we know how the trial is going to work out, or we know what the settlement
is going to look like, and we are going to get the same amount of money for the State? . . .’
[T]he answer is that there is nothing to prevent fifty attorneys general—fifty-one, from
saying, ‘Every time there is a successful class action as to which somebody in my State
purchased one of the items, we are going to file a parens patriae action, the complaint is
going to look an awful lot like the class action complaint, and we want our money? . . .’
[Y]ou can’t provide any reason why they wouldn’t do so and, presumably, would start
doing so with greater frequency if you prevail in this case.
~Oral Argument in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corporation.1

INTRODUCTION
In Mississippi ex rel. Hood, the Attorney General of Mississippi
filed a price-fixing suit on behalf of Mississippi residents against the
manufacturers, marketers, and distributors of liquid crystal displays
(LCD).2 The Supreme Court unanimously held that the state’s lawsuit
on behalf of residents could not be consolidated with private class
actions adjudicating common claims.3 Though this decision addressed
the meaning of “mass action” in the Class Action Fairness Act,4 lurking
behind that definitional question was a concern about duplicative
public-private litigation. Could the state bring claims on behalf of
residents when overlapping claims were maintained in separate,
private class actions? Permitting the state to sue separately could allow
state governments to file lawsuits duplicating private class actions,
extorting damages from defendants while free-riding on the efforts of
private attorneys.
The Chief Justice’s concerns about follow-on government
lawsuits recall the frequent criticism of private class actions trailing
government investigations—so called coattail, tagalong, or piggyback
class actions.5 Professor Coffee, for example, colorfully exhorted the

1.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 18–19, 22, 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) (No. 12-1036).
2.
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S.Ct. 736, 736 (2014); Miss. ex rel.
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2012).
3.
Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 745–46.
4.
See Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012) (defining “mass
action” as “any civil action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons . . . .”).
5.
E.g., Jaime Dodge, Privatizing Mass Settlement, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 335, 375 (2014);
Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of
Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2 (2000); Myriam Gilles
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“spectacle, one resembling the Oklahoma land rush, in which the filing
of the public agency’s action serves as the starting gun for a race
between private attorneys, all seeking to claim the prize of lucrative
class action settlements, which public law enforcement has gratuitously
presented them.”6 And Professor Rubenstein has remarked that coattail
class counsel “provides no independent search skills, no special
litigation savvy, and no nonpoliticized incentives. She simply piles on
and runs up the tab.”7
Criticism of redundant enforcement is equal opportunity.
Opponents of coattail class actions often prefer government
enforcement to private suits. As Professor Ratliff quipped “[w]hy pay
for a ‘private attorney general’ when there is a public attorney general
who works for free?”8 Others worry about government enforcement. The
Chamber of Commerce, no friend to the plaintiffs’ bar, has championed
environmental citizen suits over EPA intervention.9 Then-Attorney
General, now-Judge, William Pryor described “multigovernment
litigation” as “the land of public corruption, constitutional subversion,
and legalized antitrust conspiracies.”10 And Chief Justice Roberts
worried aloud that government attorneys would run up the tab against
class-action defendants following the Mississippi decision.11
More broadly, the mere mention of duplication is met with
resistance across a range of procedural contexts.12 Modern civil
& Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of
Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 156 (2006).
6.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer
as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 228 (1983).
7.
William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2151 (2004).
8.
Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1849 (2000).
9.
See Stephen M. Johnson, Sue and Settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen Suit, 37
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 891, 906 (2014). For a related argument with respect to civil-rights
enforcement, see Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of
Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1456 (1998).
10. William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and
Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1885, 1909 (2000).
11. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 18–19.
12. See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 582 (A.
James Casner et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985) (“Failure [to join claims] has the consequences of multiplying
and prolonging litigation, multiplying private and public legal costs, and bringing the system of
justice into unnecessary disrepute.”); Richard Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking
Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809,
811–12 (1989) (collecting sources); F. Andrew Hessick, Doctrinal Redundancies, ALA. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (collecting sources); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of
Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369, 2389 n.83–88 (2008) (collecting sources); James
E. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the Limits of Article III, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 1423, 1461 (2007) (“Congress enacted CAFA in part because state court class action practices
unfairly burden corporate defendants with overlapping and duplicative litigation.”).
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procedure evinces a “maximalist” preference against redundancy;13 the
American Law Institute, in its measured way, has sought to increase
opportunities for centralization in settlement and litigation;14 and
Professor Redish, less measuredly, has called for “zero tolerance” of
duplicative litigation.15
As a general matter, these critics are correct. Duplication is
costly and unfair, and we should worry that unjustified redundancy is
the result of inattention or worse.16 Accepting this conclusion, however,
does not mean that redundancy is never justified. Scholars of
engineering and public administration have built up a powerful
literature about the potential uses of redundancy,17 and this Article
applies those insights to overlapping public and private enforcement in
U.S. law.18 This analysis thus rejects the use “redundant” as a rhetorical
cudgel and invites those scholars and policymakers who deploy that
label to engage in a more productive discussion of when and how
redundancy can serve law’s enforcement goals.19
The focus of this Article is what I call “redundant public-private
enforcement.” Redundant public-private enforcement describes legal
regimes in which public and private agents may seek overlapping

13. See Lahav, supra note 12, at 2382; Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed
Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82
TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2249–50 (2008); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 19–21 (1991).
14. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 1.02, 2.02, 2.08, 2.12 (AM.
LAW INST. 2010).
15. Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero
Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1349
(2000). When redundant litigation creates a litigation option for some plaintiffs, as it seems to do
in Mississippi, courts and scholars are particularly wary. See Zachary D. Clopton, Transnational
Class Actions in the Shadow of Preclusion, 90 IND. L. J. 1387, 1396 n.5 (2015) (collecting sources
and decisions denying class certification on this basis).
16. Public choice may explain some of the existing redundant-enforcement regimes. See, e.g.,
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1
(1991). This Article is indifferent to the causes of redundancy. Instead, the goal is to understand
when and how redundancy can be a valuable legislative strategy.
17. See infra Section III.A (collecting and discussing relevant literatures).
18. See infra Part I (surveying areas of law). As noted below, occasionally legal scholars have
discussed redundancy with respect to specific areas of law or to questions unrelated to
enforcement. See infra notes 67–74.
19. This productive discussion is particular significant in a legal environment in which
litigation plays such a central role in enforcement. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL
LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 103 (2003); Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert
M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 662 (2013); J. Maria Glover, The
Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137,
1176–1177 (2012).
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remedies for the same conduct on substantially similar theories.20
Importantly for the normative claims to follow, and in contrast to critics
of redundancy, I further divide redundant enforcement into “redundant
authority” and “redundant litigation.” Redundant authority describes
the ability of multiple agents to bring separate enforcement actions that
are mutually preclusive—public and private actors may have
overlapping causes of action, but private-enforcement suits preclude
future governmental litigation on the same claims, and vice versa. As
argued below, redundant authority across diverse agents may respond
to errors, resource constraints, information problems, or agency costs at
the level of case selection. Redundant public-private authority should
mean that fewer good cases are missed, and claims-processing rules
should allocate cases in response to particular enforcement pathologies.
Redundant enforcement also may take the form of “redundant
litigation.” Redundant litigation describes regimes in which public and
private agents may file overlapping lawsuits, and the resolution of one
suit does not preclude adjudication of the other.21 Redundant litigation
may respond to some of the same problems as redundant authority, but
it targets case outcomes—undervalued settlements or judgments
resulting from agent (under-) performance. This Article explains that
redundant litigation may cure existing under-enforcement and deter
future under-enforcement by allowing a second agent to fill the
remedial gap, again depending on relevant differences between public
and private enforcers. That said, redundant litigation by itself risks
over-enforcement in the form of multiple punishments. Thus,
legislatures adopting redundant litigation should rely on offsets to
mitigate over-enforcement and claims-processing rules to reduce
waste.22 Moreover, critics of redundancy often are not clear on whether
they are objecting to redundant-authority or redundant-litigation
approaches. This Article seeks to clarify those definitions and articulate
the circumstances that may justify each design.

20. For further elaboration of what constitutes “redundant enforcement,” see infra notes 30,
41, 54.
21. Scholars typically treat public and private enforcers as substitutes. See infra notes 30,
41. As noted above, in redundant authority, agents have complementary authority, thought they
are substitutes in practice. In redundant litigation, however, agents are complementary in
authority and in the courtroom.
22. Though not the subject of this paper, the distinction between redundant authority and
redundant litigation also has consequences for the procedural protections necessary in each suit.
Compare Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, MINN L. REV.
(forthcoming) (debating protections necessary for individuals represented by government suits),
with Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys
General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 507–10 (2012) (same).
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The natural place for this defense of redundant public-private
enforcement is the substantial and growing literature comparing public
and private enforcement of law.23 But this literature routinely fails to
grapple with redundant enforcement. The typical article in this vein
totes up the relative advantages and disadvantages of private and
public enforcement. These articles treat public and private enforcers as
engaged in a zero-sum contest for enforcement jurisdiction. These
enforcement scholars rightly observe that public and private enforcers
differ on meaningful dimensions. Indeed, these differences are
necessary to allow redundancy to work in the ways described below. But
the conclusions of these scholars, who assume that public and private
enforcement are substitutes, miss both the descriptive reality and
potential normative gains of complementary public and private
enforcement. Filling these gaps, Part I documents the widespread use
of redundant public-private enforcement in current law, and Part II
draws on the engineering and political-science literatures to offer a
defense of that practice and a transsubstantive template for its use.
Redundancy may not be the right fit for every situation, but it would be
misguided to reject it without a second thought.
I. EXISTING REDUNDANT PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Redundant public-private enforcement is nothing new. The
private enforcement of public law has been a central regulatory strategy
for decades,24 with historical antecedents tracing back centuries.25
Meanwhile, for hundreds of years, governments have sued to vindicate
seemingly private claims of their citizens,26 culminating in modern
litigation such as the consumer-protection suit that was the subject of
Mississippi ex rel. Hood.27 In many of these cases, public and private
suits overlap. And yet, as noted above, the enforcement literature often
ignores redundant public-private enforcement.28
23. See infra notes 30, 41 (collecting sources on public and private enforcement).
24. See, e.g., Burbank et al., supra note 19, at 645; Glover, supra note 19, at 1146.
25. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 290–92 (1989); Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 2140
(quoting an email from Professor Steven Yeazell for the proposition that “private litigants for a
millennium have sought prospective, specific remedies: replevin and ejectment were probably the
two most commonly used remedies for 800 years, as long as land and livestock were major
components of the economy.”).
26. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (discussing the kingly roots of
parens patriae).
27. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text (discussing Hood).
28. See infra notes 30, 41 (collecting sources). Not all literature on public-private
enforcement ignores overlapping enforcement completely. Burbank, Farhang, and Kritzer’s study
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This Part begins by surveying redundant public-private
enforcement—i.e., enforcement schemes in which public and private
actors may maintain separate but overlapping suits seeking the same
remedies for the same conduct.29 This Part then turns to those
procedural and remedial rules that govern when overlapping publicprivate claims are maintained, managed, and extinguished.
Significantly, there is no universal template for rules on preclusion,
damages, and claims processing that modulate public-private
enforcement.
Note that this discussion does not endeavor to identify every
extant enforcement regime and its associated procedural and remedial
rules. The minimal goal here is to contextualize the analysis of
redundant enforcement in a legal environment in which redundancy is
common, transsubstantive, and varied in its approaches. Thus, those
scholars who fail to engage with the reality of redundant enforcement
miss an important opportunity to shape policy that is (or at least should
be) subject to debate.
A. Redundant Enforcement Regimes
This Section describes a range of examples of public-private
enforcement, loosely grouped into three categories: (1) “private” claims;
(2) “public” claims; and (3) hybrid regimes. These categories are blurry,
but crisp divisions are not necessary here. The purpose of these
divisions is to draw a general outline of the public-private enforcement
landscape.

expressly identified private, public, and hybrid models. See Burbank et al., supra note 19, at 688.
And yet, even when acknowledging this third option, they addressed the advantages and
disadvantages of private enforcement without expressly discussing redundant litigation. Id. at
662, 667. Farhang and Yaver’s careful study of fragmented enforcement acknowledges overlapping
public-private enforcement, but they do not differentiate between redundant authority and
redundant litigation, nor do they breakout public-private overlap from public-public overlap. See
Sean Farhang & Miranda Yaver, Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law,
AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming).
29. For example, private suits for compensatory damages would be redundant with public
suits aggregating all compensable injuries among state residents, but would not be redundant with
public suits seeking only reimbursement of state Medicaid funds. Without question, the scope of
“redundancy” theory will depend of the level of identity required between suits. The analysis here
is functionalist—focusing on the lawmaker’s enforcement goals and the incentives and effects for
parties—though an institutional designer could limit redundant enforcement to formally defined
redundant regimes. See infra note 45 (discussing statutory preclusion); infra notes 122–123, 125
and accompanying text (discussing offsets and remedial labels).
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1. “Private” Claims
On one end of the spectrum are cases in which government
actors bring claims that seem to address private rights.30 I refer here to
rights for which private parties have a remedy in court, so public
enforcement necessarily has the capacity to overlap with private suits
in these cases.
Many examples of the public enforcement of private claims fall
under the parens patriae label.31 Parens patriae refers to the commonlaw right of a sovereign to bring suit on behalf of its citizens, though the
term has been used to describe a larger set of governmental actions that
seek to vindicate private rights.32 Parens patriae actions address a wide
range of issues. Notable cases have involved claims related to
asbestos,33 tobacco,34 and firearms,35 and lesser known examples can be
found in antitrust, tax, insurance, and other areas.36
A useful illustration comes from Mississippi ex rel. Hood, which
provided the quotation at the start of this Article.37 In that case, the
State of Mississippi filed an antitrust and consumer-protection suit on
behalf of state residents against the LCD industry.38 The state sought
equitable and monetary relief on behalf of its citizens under antitrust
and consumer-protection statutes, even though citizens had private
rights of action under the same laws.39 The Supreme Court held that
30. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 22; Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 4–5 (2014); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake
of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 661 (2012); Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore
Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens
Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1864 (2000); Lemos, supra note 22, at 494–95; Adam S. Zimmerman,
Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 535–36 (2011); Adam S. Zimmerman, Mass Settlement
Rivalries, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 382–83 (2013).
31. See, e.g., Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining parens
patriae to mean, inter alia, “[a] doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit
on behalf of a citizen”); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600–05
(1982) (discussing parens patriae in U.S. law).
32. See Lemos, supra note 22, at 494. These public suits may draw on common-law or
statutory sources for substantive rights as well as for the authority to bring such actions. Id. at
495; see, e.g., supra note 2 (citing cases discussing Mississippi statutory claims).
33. E.g., Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1993).
34. See generally Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 1862 (discussing tobacco litigation).
35. See generally David Kairys, The Origin and Development of the Governmental Handgun
Cases, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1173 (2000).
36. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 526 (2012) (authorizing private and state actions against debt relief
agencies); Lemos, supra note 22, 496 n.40 (collecting cases).
37. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text (discussing Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU
Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014)).
38. Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 740.
39. See Miss. ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796, 800–02 (5th Cir. 2012).
Individual consumers had causes of action under the same statutes. Id. at 801. At least some
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the state suit could go forward in state court despite a consolidated,
nationwide class action alleging the same claims.40
2. “Public” Claims
On the other end of the spectrum are cases in which private
actors litigate seemingly public rights.41 Again, these private suits
complement public enforcement of the same claims.
The so-called “citizen suit” exemplifies the private enforcement
of public rights.42 The citizen suit is characterized by a lawsuit for
injunctive or declaratory relief in order to compel compliance with the
law, though many citizen-suit provisions permit monetary awards as
well.43 Citizen-suit options are particularly common in environmental
statutes.44 Indeed, according to Professor Thompson, “[e]very major
environmental law passed since 1970 now includes a citizen suit
provision (with the anomalous exception of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).”45 Explicit citizen-suit provisions also
exist in consumer-protection and voting-rights statutes, among
others.46 And at common law, private and public actors may be able to
private claims were settled prior to the Court’s decision. See, e.g., In re TFT–LCD (Flat Panel)
Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, 2013 WL 1365900, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013).
40. Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 743–44. The nationwide suit was consolidated in federal court
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15; see supra
note 4.
41. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 85 (Ira Katznelson et al. eds., 2010); Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler,
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1974);
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2002); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean
Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1551 (2014);
Burbank et al., supra note 19, at 665; Erichson, supra note 5, at 17; William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1975); A. Mitchell Polinsky,
Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 107 (1980); Rubenstein, supra
note 7, at 2141, 2143–44; Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 117–19 (2005).
42. See, e.g., Citizen Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “citizen suit” to
mean “[a]n action under a statute giving citizens the right to sue violators of the law (esp.
environmental law) and to seek injunctive relief and penalties”).
43. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012) (granting district courts the
authority to “apply any appropriate civil penalties” in Clean Water Act citizen suits).
44. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (2012); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
id. § 9659.
45. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 185, 192 (2000). But see National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(2012) (no citizen suits for NEPA); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (2012) (no citizen suits for Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976).
46. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2073(a) (2012) (creating a private right of
action for injunction (and fees) to enforce product safety rules); National Voter Registration Act of
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bring overlapping claims variously described as “diffuse private rights”
or “common public rights”—for example, a suit for the enjoyment of
natural resources.47 In each of the cases, public and private parties have
the option to enforce the law. Sometimes private and public enforcers
may each seek monetary relief,48 and sometimes private attorneys may
collect attorney fees from defendants if they win.49
In addition, in some circumstances, private parties stand in the
shoes of the government. In qui tam cases,50 a private party prosecutes
a claim on behalf of the government—for example, a claim that a
government contractor has defrauded a federal agency.51 Private
parties may litigate these cases themselves, or the government may
intervene and displace the private relator.52 Either way, the private
party may share in the government’s recovery.53
3. Hybrid Regimes
The grey area between parens patriae suits vindicating private
claims and citizen suits pursuing public-interest enforcement is
expansive in breadth and depth. It would be impossible to survey every
such provision in a digestible format, but it is worth considering the

1993, 52 U.S.C. § 20510 (2012) (private party may seek declaratory or injunctive relief and fees).
Indeed, one might say that injunctive-relief provisions of any hybrid statute authorize citizen suits.
See infra Section II.A.3 (collecting hybrid regimes).
47. E.g., Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743,
748 (7th Cir. 2004); Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n. v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1994).
48. See, e.g., Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n., 34 F.3d at 770 (“Alaska Sportfishing Association
and four individual sportfishers . . . [filed suit] seeking damages for loss of use and enjoyment of
natural resources resulting from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.”). In the seminal decision Porter
v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399 (1946), the Court allowed a federal agency to use its
statutory authority for injunctive relief to obtain monetary recovery (there, “recovery and
restitution of illegal rents”).
49. See FARHANG, supra note 41, at 92 (collecting data). Public attorneys also may be able to
recover costs. See, e.g., Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U.S. 279, 296 (1902).
50. Qui tam is short for qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, or
“who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” Qui tam, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(9th ed. 2009).
51. The most well-known U.S. qui tam statute is the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§
3729–3733 (2012), though qui tam provisions also exist in state false claims acts, e.g., CAL. GOV’T
CODE §§ 12650–12656 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1201–1211 (2015); 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 175/1–8 (2014), as well as in other federal statutes. 25 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (Indian protection
laws); 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006) (false marking of patented goods, prior to 2011 amendments). In
addition, twice the Supreme Court has suggested that a statute may imply a qui tam option if it
entitles a private party to an informer award. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 777 n.7 (2000); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943).
52. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (permitting the government to take over FCA suit).
53. See id. § 3730(d) (providing relator recovery of fifteen to twenty-five percent if the
government intervenes, or twenty-five to thirty percent if the government does not).
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range of regimes to better understand the place of redundant publicprivate enforcement in U.S. law.54
Perhaps the easiest way to organize this material is by area of
law, and I will begin here with antitrust enforcement. Antitrust law
serves both public and private values. According to the Supreme Court:
“Congress created the Sherman Act’s private cause of action not solely
to compensate individuals, but to promote ‘the public interest in
vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws.’”55 There is overlapping
public and private enforcement of the antitrust provisions of the
Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and sections of the Robinson-Partman Act
and Wilson Tariff Act.56 Importantly for present purposes, public and
private antitrust enforcement may proceed redundantly. Private
enforcement of antitrust law frequently takes the form of “coattail class
actions,” which are private suits following the announcement of public
enforcement.57 Private actions also might alert public regulators of a
potential problem, leading to follow-on public enforcement.58 Finally,
public and private recoveries may interact as the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has dedicated some disgorgement awards from
government antitrust settlements for distribution to private parties.59
Securities enforcement tracks many elements of the antirustlaw story. Securities suits claim to vindicate both public and private
values.60 Securities law is characterized by a high degree of private
54. Most of the examples here are from federal law, though state law also may provide for
overlapping enforcement. See, e.g., Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Private Attorney General
Doctrine—State Cases, 106 A.L.R. 5th 523 (2003) (collecting state cases).
55. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) (quoting Lawlor v. Nat’l
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955)).
56. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (authorizing suits by individuals injured by any conduct
prohibited by “antitrust laws,” defined in 15 U.S.C. § 12); id. §§ 4, 9, 15a, 15b, 25 (authorizing
federal or state enforcement of provisions of the aforementioned acts).
57. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 5, at 5–7 (noting that more than one hundred “coattail
class actions” followed the government’s antitrust investigation of Microsoft).
58. See, e.g., Arthur M. Kaplan, Antitrust as a Public-Private Partnership: A Case Study of
the NASDAQ Litigation, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 111, 114–16 (2001) (noting that private lawsuits
“resuscitat[ed]” public antitrust enforcement against NASDAQ). This phenomenon is not unique
to antitrust. See Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega Social
Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 518 (2001):
Private attorneys general, not government regulators, discovered that Firestone Tires
mounted on Ford Explorers caused hundreds of rollover accidents due to tread
separation. . . . The NHTSA [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration] based
its recall of 6.5 million tires on information provided by plaintiff’s counsel, rather than
[by] in-house government investigators.
59. See, e.g., In re First Databank Antitrust Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 96, 101 (D.D.C. 2002)
(discussing FTC settlement offset); FED. TRADE COMM’N, Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable
Remedies in Competition Cases, 68 Fed. Reg. 45820-03 (Aug. 4, 2003) (discussing FTC’s use of
restitution).
60. E.g., S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8 (1995) (discussing compensation and deterrence).
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enforcement, whether through implied61 or express62 rights of action,
but it also involves public enforcement by various federal and state
agencies.63 Private action may ride the coattails of public enforcement,64
or may motivate it.65 Finally, like the FTC, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) may attempt to compensate victims of securities
fraud through the “fair funds program,” which distributes recoveries
collected in public enforcement actions to private parties—even when
redundant private securities actions may be available or ongoing.66
Redundant private and public enforcement is also quite common
in civil rights, labor, and employment. Public and private parties may
bring overlapping employment suits alleging discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,67 disability,68 or age.69
Public and private suits can vindicate federal rules on minimum wage
or maximum hour,70 family and medical leave,71 whistleblower
protection,72 or migrant and seasonal agricultural worker standards.73
The Fair Housing Act provides for overlapping public and private

61. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs’ Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993)
(1934 Securities Exchange Act, Section 10(b) contribution action); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394–95 (1982) (Commodities Exchange Act);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1971) (1934 Securities
Exchange Act, Section 10(b)); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964) (1934 Securities
Exchange Act, Section 14(a)).
62. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012) (manipulation of security prices); id. § 78r (misleading
statements); id. § 78t-1 (insider trading).
63. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–359-h (McKinney 2015) (“Martin Act”) (providing
authority to New York State Attorney General); SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 939–40
(1935) (holding that the SEC had independent litigating authority). For criticism of the claim that
private enforcement supplements SEC enforcement, see Maria Correia & Michael Klausner, Are
Securities Class Actions “Supplemental” to SEC Enforcement? An Empirical Analysis 2–45 (May
15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA
%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2013-Reading/papers/EFMA2013_0593_fullpaper.pdf
[http://perma.cc/C834-456J].
64. Erichson, supra note 5, at 6–7.
65. See Kaplan, supra note 58, at 114–16 (discussing NASDAQ case).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012). See generally Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for
Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 331–95
(2015); Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1103, 1103–44 (2008). Private class actions were filed in sixty-five percent of cases in which
the SEC created a fair fund, and investors were entitled to private recoveries in nearly half of these
cases. Velikonja, supra, at 373.
67. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012).
68. Americans with Disabilities Act, id. § 12117(a).
69. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2012).
70. Fair Labor Standards Act, id. § 216.
71. Family and Medical Leave Act, id. § 2617.
72. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
73. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1852–54 (2012).
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enforcement,74 and courts have found implied private rights of action in
various civil rights statutes that also authorize public enforcement.75
Consumer protection is yet another area rife with redundant
public-private enforcement options. Various federal and state consumer
protection statutes permit private and public claims.76 A recent report
from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) studied
overlapping public-private enforcement in consumer finance, and even
this limited study identified more than one hundred occasions of
overlapping public and private enforcement from 2008 to 2012.77
Government action preceded private enforcement in many of these
cases,78 fitting the “coattail class action” model,79 though the CFPB
identified far more cases in which public enforcement rode the coattails
of private suits.80
Private and public enforcement overlap in any number of other
federal and state enforcement schemes. The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) relies on private and public actions81; the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act provides for private and public
civil suits;82 and public and private civil actions may enforce the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.83 More
obscurely, the U.S. Attorney General, state attorneys general, and
“boxers” may sue under the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act,84 and
educational institutions and the FTC may sue sports agents for unfair

74. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2012).
75. E.g., Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 230–35 (1996) (Section 10 of the
Voting Rights Act (“VRA”)); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–51 (1986) (Section 2 of the VRA);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 689–708 (1979) (Title IX); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544, 554–57 (1969) (Section 5 of the VRA).
76. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o, 1681s (2012) (public and private enforcement under
the Truth in Lending Act); 39 U.S.C. § 3017 (2012) (liability for mailing skill contest or sweepstakes
to individual who requested exclusion); 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012) (liability for telephone solicitation
to individual who requested exclusion); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform
Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1384, 1430 n.189 (2000) (discussing Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
77. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT
TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A), § 9 (2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf
[http://perma.cc/94XG-V8QU].
78. Id.
79. See Erichson, supra note 5, at 5–7.
80. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 77, at § 9.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2012).
83. Id. § 1964.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 6309 (2012). “Boxer” is defined as “an individual who fights in a professional
boxing match.” Id. § 6301.
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and deceptive acts with respect to student athletes.85 Finally, although
not entirely relevant to this Article’s inquiry, there are various
statutory schemes in which public criminal enforcement operates in
parallel with public or private civil enforcement.86 RICO87 and some
antirust rules88 may be enforced through criminal prosecution or civil
suits.89 During Prohibition, criminal enforcement of the alcohol laws
was supplemented by private civil actions for property damage by an
intoxicated person against the provider of liquor.90 And, amusingly,
while the U.S. government offers awards to private parties who help
detect customs violations, if a public official tips off a private party in
exchange for a share of that award, she may be the subject of a criminal
prosecution and the complicit private party may bring a civil action to
get her money back.91 Although criminal restitution reflects some
elements of the public enforcement discussed here, this Article’s focus
remains on overlapping civil enforcement.
B. Managing Redundancy
Whether private, public, or hybrid in subject matter, each of the
described regimes allows both public and private actors to bring suit.
But the authority to sue on the same claim does not tell the whole story.
The procedural and remedial rules that govern these suits provide
important context. Preclusion determines whether the redundant suit
is maintained or extinguished. Damages rules determine whether
consecutive actions will manifest in redundant payouts—whether
defendants pay twice, and whether redundant plaintiffs recover
irrespective of the result of the first case. Claims-processing rules
determine whether redundant litigation is sequential or simultaneous,
and if sequential, which suit goes first. This Section reviews the varied
approaches to preclusion, damages, and claims processing in redundant

85. Id. §§ 7803, 7805. For a few other examples, see 12 U.S.C §§ 1972, 1975 (2012) (private
and public enforcement against bank tying arrangements); 47 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 274 (2012)
(rights of action under the Communication Act); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 597, 597a (2012) (private and
public actions under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act).
86. Criminal law also may overlap with common-law liability. See, e.g., Thomas Koenig &
Michael Rustad, “Crimtorts” as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 292–93
(1998).
87. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012).
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (2012).
89. Criminal and private civil enforcement also are available in connection with sexual
exploitation or child abuse. 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012); Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710,
1718–22 (2014) (discussing criminal restitution to victims of child pornography).
90. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, title II, § 20, 41 Stat. 313 (repealed 1935).
91. 19 U.S.C. § 1620 (2012).
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enforcement in U.S. law. At best, current law offers an extensive
experiment in the many combinations of these rules. Less charitably,
current law is a muddle calling out for the coherence that Part II hopes
to offer.
1. Preclusion
The first potential management tool for redundant enforcement
is preclusion. Although preclusion has a precise legal definition,92 it is
used here to refer to any situation in which prior adjudication forecloses
a future suit, whether based on a statutory or judicially enunciated rule.
Indeed, in these situations, preclusion more likely refers to a statutory
rule that bars litigation than to the traditional form of judge-made
preclusion.93 The type of “preclusion” relevant here involves the effect
of a prior disposition on a non-party plaintiff—the effect of a settlement
or judgment in a public suit on a putative private plaintiff, or vice
versa.94 Again, if the first suit precludes the second, then redundant
authority stops short of redundant litigation. If preclusion does not
attach, redundant litigation is permitted and the second suit proceeds
irrespective of the outcome in the first case.95
To begin with a general observation, public and private suits are
neither universally preclusive nor universally non-preclusive. In some
situations, public and private enforcement actions are mutually nonpreclusive. In antitrust, for example, the Supreme Court explained that
“the Government is not bound by private antitrust litigation to which it
is a stranger,” while “private parties, similarly situated, are not bound
by government litigation.”96 In addition, in various voting rights cases,

92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1982); Kevin Clermont,
Res Judicata as Requisite for Justice 1–58 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No.
15-22, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2614433 [http://perma.cc/TJV9-UACV].
93. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. Note that because we are dealing with
statutory rules of “preclusion,” the legislature has flexibility in defining which parties and which
claims are subject to preclusion.
94. This discussion may bring to mind United States v. Mendoza, in which the Supreme
Court held that nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not apply against the federal
government. 464 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1984). Nonmutual offensive issue preclusion describes a new
plaintiff’s use of a finding of fact from an earlier proceeding to establish part of its case against the
defendant from that earlier case. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329–33
(1979). Even if one accepted the Mendoza rule uncritically, it relates to findings adverse to a party
to both proceedings—but here we are potentially dealing with the effect of findings on a nonparty.
95. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
96. Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 690 (1961). State antitrust enforcement
under the Clayton Act, however, does preclude private actions. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(2)–(3) (2012); see
Cox, supra note 22, at 23–29 (discussing this example).
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courts have allowed public litigation to follow private suits on the same
claims, or vice versa.97 These cases thus permit redundant litigation.
In other situations, public and private suits are mutually
preclusive. Traditionally, preclusion does not attach to non-parties.98
But in some cases of redundant public-private enforcement, preclusion
applies to non-parties as a result of common-law exceptions to the
special
considerations
for
government
background
rule,99
representation,100 or specific statutory provisions.101 Courts have found
preclusion between public and private actions in cases involving
ERISA,102 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,103 and the Fair
Labor Standards Act,104 to name a few.105 Qui tam regimes also may
97. E.g., Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 268 n.23 (1982) (“The Attorney General is not
bound by the resolution of § 5 issues in cases to which he was not a party.”); Cleveland Cty. Ass’n
for Gov’t by People v. Cleveland Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 468, 473–74, 474 n.11 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (private following public).
98. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (“[O]ne is not bound by a judgment in
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made
a party by service of process.”).
99. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (discussing privity). For example, the
Ninth Circuit held that California Attorney General restitution claims in an unfair competition
case were precluded by a prior class action settlement on the same claims. California v.
IntelliGender, LLC, 771 F.3d 1169, 1179–82 (9th Cir. 2014).
100. For example, whether the government adequately represented its citizens has been
treated differently by courts than private versions of the same inquiry. See Lemos, supra note 22,
at 508–10. Indeed, some courts “presum[e] that the state will adequately represent the position of
its citizens.” Alaska Sport Fishing Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 773 (1994).
101. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sarafoglou v. Weill Medical Coll. of Cornell Univ., 451 F.
Supp. 2d 613, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“In the qui tam context, the relator is in privity with the
Government.”).
102. E.g., Herman v. S.C. Nat’l Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1422–27 (11th Cir. 1998); Beck v.
Levering, 947 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1991); Sec’y of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 687–97
(7th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1462–63 (5th Cir. 1983). Courts
reaching this conclusion seek to cast ERISA in public-minded terms. See, e.g., Herman, 140 F.3d
at 1423:
[I]n suing for ERISA violations, the Secretary seeks not only to recoup plan losses, but
also to supervise enforcement of ERISA, to guarantee uniform compliance with ERISA,
to expose and deter plan asset mismanagement, to protect federal revenues, to
safeguard the enormous amount of assets and investments funded by ERISA plans, and
to assess civil penalties for ERISA violations.
One could say the same about any number of statutes that protect private rights. See, e.g., 29
U.S.C. §§ 626, 1852–54, 2617 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012).
103. The ADEA provides that public enforcement bars subsequent private suits. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(c)(1) (2012). Some courts have treated private ADEA suits as preclusive on the EEOC. E.g.,
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1990) (Alito, J.).
104. Compare Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 920–23 (9th Cir. 2003) (private
FLSA suit bars public enforcement), with 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (providing that public suits
preclude subsequent private suits).
105. Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protections limit private actions if the DOL issued a
final decision. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). At least one court held that a private judgment precluded
future public enforcement. Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961–63 (9th Cir. 2006).
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apply mutual non-party preclusion,106 though the meaning of “party” is
complicated by this peculiar type of suit.107
In still other areas, preclusion is asymmetric. Some statutes
codify one-way preclusion. A number of civil rights statutes provide that
private actions may be cut off by public enforcement,108 and EPA actions
trump environmental citizen suits even though private suits would not
preclude public enforcement.109 Particularly when the government is
pursuing a public-oriented remedy, there seems to be a background
understanding that private actions do not preclude redundant public
enforcement.110 Meanwhile, many courts are willing to treat
representative public actions as preclusive on private suits—i.e.,
private citizens may not litigate individual claims if the state previously
litigated on their behalf.111 Finally, note that issue preclusion112 (or its
analog113) also may operate in these cases to reduce the costs of the
second suit by making findings from the original suit binding in the
second.
To sum up briefly, public-private preclusion attaches in some but
not all cases; it may depend on judicial doctrine, statutory language,
and individual case factors; and it may be symmetrical, asymmetrical,
or issue specific.

106. In re Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1997), held that the government is bound by a
qui tam judgment even if it did not intervene. Id. at 885. The government conceded this point at
argument in KBR v. U.S. ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015). Relatedly, some courts reject pro
se relators to avoid precluding the government. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v.
Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2008).
107. For discussion of a related issue, see Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765 (2000) (Article III standing in qui tam suits).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (Fair Labor Standards Act); id. § 626(c)(1) (Age Discrimination
in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2012) (Fair Housing Act).
109. See supra note 44. For example, according to the Ninth Circuit: “the United States would
not be bound by the proposed consent judgment in this action [under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act] and could bring its own enforcement action at any time.” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec.
Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1356 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted).
110. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, 18A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4458.1 (2d ed 2002.); Cox,
supra note 22 (collecting cases). But this rough guide does not account for all cases nor does it
explain which hybrid cases are public or private.
111. See, e.g., Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns., Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993). Courts
retain discretion to determine if the government suit sufficiently represented private interests.
See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001).
112. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see also Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
113. Section 5 of the Clayton Act, for example, treats a finding of liability in a government
action as prima facie evidence of a violation in a follow-on private suit. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2012).
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2. Damages
Damages rules are a second set of tools to structure publicprivate enforcement. Civil damages are the central form of deterrence
and compensation in many of these areas, and the ability to obtain
damages is a key incentive for enforcement actions.114 Under various
statutes, public and private actors may obtain overlapping remedies,115
though at times damages are characterized differently for public and
private parties.116 Related to damages are private attorney fees, which
may be a necessary incentive for private actions.117 Attorney fees are
available in some but not all cases.118
If redundant authority becomes redundant litigation, an
important question is whether damages are cumulative or concurrent—
will a defendant pay double because she is subject to sequential
enforcement suits?119 The answer to this question has significant
consequences for (over- or under-) deterrence, (over- or under-)
compensation, and fairness.120 Again, outcomes are not consistent
across regulatory areas.121 In both antitrust and securities enforcement,
for example, the general rule is that a defendant will be able to offset
compensatory or disgorgement awards.122 If recoveries in a public suit
114. See, e.g., supra note 59.
115. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012) (ERISA); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012) (employment
discrimination); id. § 3613 (Fair Housing Act).
116. For example, private suits for bank-tying arrangements receive treble damages, while
public enforcement seeks civil penalties. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1972, 1975 (2012). Available remedies also
may differ markedly between public and private suits. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-1(b), 78u-1(a)(2)
(2012) (civil penalties to SEC and private actions for profit gained or loss avoided in insider
trading).
117. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 41; Burbank, et al., supra note 19 (collecting data on fee
provisions in private-enforcement statutes).
118. Interestingly, attorney fees do not always depend on private recovery. In antitrust suits,
even when a prior settlement with a co-defendant reduced a plaintiff’s right to compensatory
damages to zero, courts will permit litigation against the non-settling defendant for purpose of
determining whether plaintiff is entitled to fees. See, e.g., Funeral Consumers All. v. Serv. Corp.
Int’l, 695 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2012).
119. See infra note 250 (collecting sources on “multiple punishments”).
120. See, e.g., Winship, supra note 66 (discussing McAfee securities case).
121. The Supreme Court has cautioned on multiple occasions that “it goes without saying that
the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,
534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980)). But, of
course, the issue here is not double recovery by the same party, but double liability paid by the
same defendant to two different parties. See infra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing
compensation). And, notably, the Court’s logic depended in part on the equitable nature of Title
VII remedies, a status unlikely to attach to damage awards in many statutory and common-law
schemes. See Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980).
122. E.g., In re First Databank Antitrust Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 96, 98–101 (D.D.C. 2002)
(antitrust); Litton Indus. v. Lehman, 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1074–78 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (securities). That
said, courts have found ways to permit redundant suits to go forward even following public
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are characterized as civil penalties, they will be independent of private
damages, i.e., they are not subject to offset.123 Courts have taken steps
in other areas to avoid double recovery,124 but again public and private
remedies do not always offset symmetrically.125 Reliance on judicial
discretion also adds uncertainty to the enforcement regime. In one
particularly interesting set of cases, courts adopted different attitudes
regarding whether punitive damages in state tobacco settlements
should affect private damages in overlapping suits depending on how
the court characterized the purposes of the punitive awards.126 These
cases not only subjected defendants to what might be called double
liability, but they also suggested that future defendants could not rely
on courts to offset damages in similar cases.
3. Claims Processing
Finally, relevant to both redundant authority and redundant
litigation are various doctrines that loosely fall under the label “claims
processing.”127 Courts have at their disposal tools such as stays and
anti-suit injunctions that can modulate otherwise simultaneous private
and public enforcement actions.128 Various enforcement statutes also
include specific claims-processing rules. For example, environmental
statutes often require private notice to the government129 and the Class
Action Fairness Act directs notice to state and federal officials of
proposed class action settlements.130 Meanwhile, the Civil Rights Act of
disgorgement awards. See, e.g., In re Spear, 399 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2005). The
relationship between fair fund distributions and private settlements also appears inconsistent.
See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp., 293 F.R.D. 459, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing one settlement that
accounts for fair funds and one that does not).
123. E.g., First Databank, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 101.
124. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) (citing Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 n.14 (1974)).
125. See, e.g., Herman v. S.C. Nat. Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1424–25 (11th Cir. 1998) (collecting
ERISA and non-ERISA cases).
126. See Cox, supra note 22 (collecting cases). In the cited case, a private litigant is permitted
to pursue compensatory damages but not punitive ones, because the state previous claimed a
punitive-damage award in its settlement agreement. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. 2006). Although Cox (and the court) characterized this an issue of
preclusion, one could easily conceptualize it as a question of damages.
127. See Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010).
128. While courts have the inherent authority to enjoin parties before them, they have less
power over other courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012) (Anti-Injunction Act).
129. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(2) (2012) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(2) (2012)
(Clean Air Act). Environmental statutes are not unique in this regard. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6104(b)
(2012) (private actions against telemarketers).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(a) (2012); see, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice
Provision: Optimal Regulatory Policy?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971 (2008); Laurens Walker, The
Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake, 58 HAST. L.J. 849 (2007).
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1991 called for notice to affected private parties in government suits.131
Sometimes the notice provision has direct consequences for litigation:
in environmental statutes, private plaintiffs give notice to the
government in order to permit the EPA to bring a public enforcement
proceeding.132
Claims-processing rules may give priority to particular
plaintiffs. Environmental citizen-suit provisions exhibit a preference
for public enforcement, barring private suits if the government is
diligently prosecuting.133 Other statutes allow multiple parties to join
the same suit: some enforcement regimes expressly allow for private
intervention into public suits,134 while others allow public intervention
into private suits.135 In some cases, failing to intervene may be
understood as acquiescence in the first representation, thus triggering
preclusion of future actions.136
* * *
The takeaways from this brief survey are twofold. First,
redundant public-private enforcement does not exist in a vacuum, but
is subject to rules that structure how and when claims may be brought.
Redundant authority becomes redundant litigation only if preclusion
rules allow the second suit, while damages and claims-processing rules
structure enforcement in both models. Second, there is no uniform
template for how redundant public-private enforcement proceeds in
U.S. law. Instead, legislatures and courts have applied different
procedural approaches to different regulatory regimes. Indeed, in many
circumstances, the statutes providing for redundant enforcement are
unclear about the intended procedural rules, and courts have not
always responded with precise answers. In this way, redundant
Conversely, during debates leading up to the adoption of the Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968,
the Justice Department opposed efforts to consolidate public and private enforcement even for the
limited purpose of pretrial proceedings. See Andrew Bradt, A “Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict
Litigation Act of 1968 and the Strategic Expansion of Judicial Power, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2012).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2012) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2012)
(Clean Air Act).
133. See supra note 132. Not all government action is “diligent.” See, e.g., Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 178 n.1 (2000).
134. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2012) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (Title
VII).
135. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012) (private rights of action and FCC intervention in suits
regarding telephone equipment); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2).
136. In Adams v. Proctor & Gamble Manuf. Co., 697 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1983) the Fourth
Circuit held that a private plaintiff who did not intervene in an EEOC suit was bound by the
outcome of the government’s action. Id. at 583 (en banc) (per curiam).
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enforcement is both a doctrinal and policy challenge that deserves
considered attention, which in turn demands a deeper understanding
of the institutions and goals of redundant public-private enforcement.
II. DESIGNING REDUNDANT PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
The foregoing discussion suggests that redundant authority and
litigation exist across a range of enforcement schemes, yet the trend in
modern procedure is to oppose duplication in favor of centralization. 137
The logic of this opposition is straightforward: redundancy, compared
to one-shot enforcement, may increase direct costs, create complication
through multiple enforcers, and lead to over-enforcement.138
I could spend countless pages highlighting devices that may
mitigate these costs—settlements139 and preclusion doctrines140 reduce
actual relitigation costs, agency gatekeeping may approximate
monopoly control over prosecutorial discretion,141 former-recovery
doctrines often avoid over-enforcement142—but this Article aspires to
change the discourse. Conceding that lawmakers should work to reduce
unnecessary costs of enforcement, this Part argues that the
conversation needs to include a fuller understanding of the benefits that
redundant enforcement may provide.
This Part begins with redundancy theory, exploring the
potential benefits of redundant enforcement with a focus on errors,
resources, information, and agency costs. The claim here is that, despite
obvious costs, redundant enforcement may serve valuable legislative
goals, particularly when multiple diverse agents can be harnessed
toward the same ends. Of course, the benefits of redundant enforcement
will not spring up without careful husbandry in the form of institutional
design. After completing its theoretical survey, this Part picks up the
institutional-design challenge, looking first at redundancy as a
response to problems with case selection and then as a response to
problems with case outcomes. The result is a defense of redundant
public-private enforcement and a transsubstantive template for its use.
137. See infra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. Part II also suggests that scholars writing
on public-private enforcement are wrong to ignore enforcement redundancy.
138. See, e.g., Burbank, et al., supra note 19; David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation
Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013); Lahav, supra note 12; Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions
and Institutional Design, 97 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1458 (2011).
139. Settlement rates are generally quite high, see infra note 269, and one would expect them
to be even higher in follow-on suits.
140. See supra notes 103–10 (discussing statutory and judge-made issue preclusion and
related doctrines).
141. See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 138.
142. See supra note 121.
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This discussion is aimed not only at critics of redundant enforcement,
but also at legislatures creating and updating enforcement regimes and
at courts considering procedural decisions that interact with legislative
choices.143 The goal is to move beyond the pejorative use of “redundancy”
to a more informed debate that considers the institutional and policy
challenges of the relevant regulatory space.
A. Redundancy Theory
While legal scholars have been slow to appreciate the benefits of
redundancy, other disciplines have taken the lead.144 Engineers have
explored how redundant components can increase systemic reliability
when components are independent.145 Political scientists have applied
these lessons to public administration, noting the presence of
redundant structures within highly reliable organizations, and
exploring how to manage strategic behavior within redundant
systems.146 This Section synthesizes these insights and applies them to
143. See infra note 295 (discussing, for example, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010)).
144. Works particularly helpful for the present study include JONATHAN B. BENDOR,
PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT (1985); C. F. LARRY HEIMANN, ACCEPTABLE
RISKS: POLITICS, POLICY, AND RISKY TECHNOLOGIES (1998); Martin Landau, Redundancy,
Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346 (1969); Allan
Lerner, There Is More than One Way to Be Redundant, 18 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 334 (1986); Michael M.
Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 274 (2003).
Recently, a few legal scholars have praised redundancy. Professor Lahav revived Professor
Cover’s notion of complex concurrency. See Lahav, supra note 12 (discussing Robert M. Cover, The
Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639
(1981)). Professor Gersen articulated the value of overlap in administrative law. See Jacob E.
Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV.
201 (2006). Professor Huq assessed redundancy in terrorism prosecutions. See Aziz Z. Huq, Forum
Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 1415 (2012). Professor Chafetz discussed
“multiplicity” in the structural constitutional order. See Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism
and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084 (2011). And Professor Kobayashi reviewed
redundant litigation in intellectual property. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of
Relitigation Rules in Intellectual Property Litigation (forthcoming). Notably, these few defenses
focused on particular areas of law and/or have ignored the public-or-private identity of the
redundant enforcers.
145. The engineering literature distinguishes between component failure and system failure.
See, e.g., HEIMANN, supra note 144, at 78. Redundancy is understood to be more effective when
dealing with component failure, id., and therefore the discussion here focuses on component failure
in law enforcement.
146. Modern debates about redundancy often pit the “highly reliable organization” (HRO)
paradigm against “normal accident” theory. Compare KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE,
MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED: ASSURING HIGH PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY (1st ed.
2001), with CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES
(1999). In the words of Larry Heimann, HRO theory accepts “the need for redundancy within and
between organizations,” while normal accident theory “disputes[s] the value of redundancy” when
facing “complex interactions and tight coupling.” HEIMANN, supra note 144, at 9. This is not a
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law enforcement. This Section first outlines the basic claim that
redundancy can improve enforcement with respect to errors, resources,
information, and agency costs, if actors are sufficiently differentiated—
applying the lessons of engineering to the problems of law enforcement.
This Section then uses the insights of political science to identify and
deal with the potential for strategic behavior, including efforts to
harness strategic behavior in a positive direction. Note that this
Section’s theory of redundancy depends on whether laws are over- or
under-enforced (with respect to case selection and case outcomes).147
This Article does not offer a universal baseline for these questions, but
instead recognizes that results must be judged against legislative
preferences expressed in the relevant regulatory regime.
First, however the optimum level of enforcement is defined,
redundancy can respond to under-enforcement resulting from random
or nonrandom (biased) errors.148 Redundancy may reduce underenforcement resulting from random error because enforcers will not
repeat the same errors in case selection or prosecution.149 This is the
“purest” engineering theory of redundancy—if parallel components
function independently, both must fail to result in system error. 150
Redundancy also may reduce under-enforcement resulting from
nonrandom bias, as long as the agents have different biases.151
Although neither public nor private agents are perfect, there are good
reasons to believe that public and private enforcers possess different
preferences and interests, and thus are susceptible to different
nonrandom biases.152 The result is that employing both public and
forum to adjudicate every aspect of these debates, though I would note that there are reasons to
think that law-enforcement regimes are not always “highly complex” or “tightly coupled.”
147. See generally, Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic
Analysis, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997; George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement
of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970) (discussing optimal enforcement levels). The distinction
between case selection and case outcomes is taken up further in Sections III.B and III.C.
148. Note that this discussion primarily addresses the problems of under-enforcement.
Redundancy is not likely a solution to over-enforcement, and its use in areas characterized by overenforcement should be viewed with a jaundiced eye.
149. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 654 n.51 (1981).
150. See David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principal-Agent Problems, and Redundancy,
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2006) (referring to this reliability-enhancing feature as “purely
engineering”). Indeed, Landau’s early advocacy for redundancy was inspired by a commercial
airliner. Landau, supra note 144, at 346.
151. See, e.g., Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated
Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617, 625–30 (1992); Ting, supra note 144, at 276.
152. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 2158–59 (discussing distinction between the
rewards for public and private attorneys). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure
as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983) (describing various incentives, and resulting
biases, in the criminal context); Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public
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private agents should reduce biased under-enforcement as well. Note,
however, that while redundancy may decrease Type II errors (false
negatives), it also may increase Type I errors (false positives).153 This is
the risk of over-enforcement noted by redundancy’s critics, and
certainly it must be part of the institutional-design discussion.154
A second explanation for under-enforcement is resource
constraints—an agent may under-enforce because it lacks the resources
to identify and prosecute all of the cases it wants.155 It does not take a
degree in engineering to understand that if independent redundant
agents bring different resources to a problem, then the total resources
available will be increased. Unsurprisingly, resource constraints are an
oft-cited explanation for under-enforcement,156 and redundancy should
improve this state of affairs if agents possess different resource pools.
Scholars have argued about whether public or private enforcers are
comparatively more resource constrained,157 but it seems reasonable to
assume that their resources differ, particularly given that some funding
mechanisms (e.g., alternative litigation financing and contingency fees)
are not equally available to public and private parties.158
Third, under-enforcement may result if the relevant agent lacks
the necessary information or expertise. Redundancy may help in these
cases too. Redundancy may serve to reveal private information,
aggregate disparate information, and facilitate learning.159
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858–63 (2014) (describing incentives for public and private
enforcers). For a classic study of prosecutorial discretion, see Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal
Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV.
1036 (1972).
153. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 144, at 1464–68; Ting, supra note 144, at 275.
154. See infra Section III.C.2.
155. Resource constraints are, in a sense, just another cause of errors, but they merit special
attention here because they are particularly salient for enforcement issues.
156. See, e.g., Burbank, et al., supra note 19, at 662. Regarding securities regulation, a SEC
Chairman observed that “[t]he Commission has long maintained that private actions provide
valuable and necessary additional deterrence against securities fraud, thereby supplementing the
Commission’s own enforcement activities.” Concerning the Impact of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Before the Subcomm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 105th
Cong. (1997) (testimony of Arthur Levitt Jr., Chairman, SEC).
157. Compare Lemos, supra note 22, at 523 (public enforcers more constrained), with
Engstrom, supra note 138, at 633 (private parties cannot “scale up”).
158. But see generally David A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a
Normative Evaluation of Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315
(2001) (discussing the use of contingency fee arrangements by attorneys general, particularly in
tobacco litigation); Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power:
Constitutional and Political Implications, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77 (2010) (discussing public use
of contingency fee). In addition, it seems likely that public and private resources vary (but may not
co-vary) with time, issue, litigant, etc.
159. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 144; Matthew Stephenson, Information Acquisition &
Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2011).
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Redundancy also permits “perspectival aggregation,” as agents may
offer a diversity of problem-solving approaches.160 This explanation is
also a resource story—the benefits of redundancy attach when agents
possess complementary intangible resources such as information,161
and public and private enforcers likely differ in their access to
information, expertise, and perspectives.162
A final potential source of under-enforcement is inherent in the
agency relationship. Principals incur costs when agent preferences
deviate from principal preferences and when principals expend effort to
monitor agents and mitigate their deviations.163 From an engineering
perspective, these agency costs may be seen as another nonrandom bias,
and thus redundancy is a potential response if agents differ with respect
to agency costs.164 Given their divergent preferences, structures, and
accountability mechanisms, agency relationships in public and private
enforcement likely differ in ways that permit beneficial redundancy.165
Redundancy also has a dynamic effect on agency costs. One
particular challenge for principals is monitoring agent performance.
For example, it is difficult for Congress to know from the outside
whether the EPA is doing a good job enforcing environmental law.
Redundant delegations have the effect of producing information that
permits principals to compare multiple diverse agents—Congress may
be able to compare public and private outcomes to better assess
performance.166 In this way, competition limits agency costs by making
it cheaper for the lawmaker to monitor the agents. In addition, if agents
are aware of this monitoring effect, redundancy should reduce

160. See, e.g., Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents, 97 J. ECON.
THEORY 123, 143 (2001); Vermeule, supra note 138, at 1452.
161. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. If information can be easily transferred
among agents—e.g., if the government could require or cheaply induce a private party to share
private information—then we might say that the information pools are not sufficiently different.
162. Many sources identify private information as an advantage of private enforcement. See,
e.g., Bucy, supra note 41, at 59, 61–62; Burbank, et al., supra note 19, at 662–64; Margaret H.
Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 707 (2011); Stephenson, supra
note 41, at 108–09. But public enforcers may have informational advantages as well; see also
Glover, supra note 19, at 1180 (suggesting that public enforcement might be preferred for large
datasets, comparative analyses, or complex facts). To give a simple example, a qui tam relator may
have private information about a contractor’s fraudulent billing, while public attorneys may have
an intimate knowledge of the government program.
163. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 339 n.48 (1976).
164. See supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 7 (preferences); Lemos, supra note 22 (structures);
Stephenson, supra note 41 (accountability); Engstrom, supra note 138 (accountability).
166. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
9–11 (1971).
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deviations because agents are competing against each other in a more
open fashion.167
In short, although redundancy has direct costs and risks overenforcement, it also can be effective at fighting under-enforcement
resulting from errors, resource constraints, information problems, or
agency costs, if agents are sufficiently diverse. But this “pure
engineering” approach can get us only so far. The redundant o-rings on
a space shuttle are not strategic actors,168 so the insights from recent
political-science literature are necessary to appreciate how these
processes work in a world of strategic human players. Particularly
relevant here are two types of strategic behavior—“shirking” and “cue
taking”—that have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of
redundant systems.169
Shirking is the risk that when a second agent is added, each
agent will reduce its effort level because of the other player. For
example, if information is endogenous—i.e., it is the result of agent
effort in information gathering—the presence of a redundant agent
might discourage that gathering effort.170 This collective action problem
should give pause to a lawmaker considering redundancy, particularly
when the first agent is fairly reliable. That said, the political science
literature suggests that this concern is not always dispositive.171 First,
the competitive redundancy described above cuts back on shirking
when parties repeatedly compete over time.172 A government agency
concerned about its budget, for example, will be less inclined to shirk if
Congress is watching. Second, not all shirking is created equal. Political
scientists suggest that the less reliable the original agent, the less her

167. See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 144, at 212–14; Huq, supra note 144, at 1479–84.
168. See, e.g., HEIMANN, supra note 144, at 53. The physical failure of o-rings in the
Challenger disaster was compounded by human error at a number of levels. Id. at 51–52.
169. For an excellent summary of the relevant political-science literature on these issues, see
id. at 17–71.
170. For example, assume Agent 1 or Agent 2 is tasked with finding evidence to prosecute an
environmental violator. If either agent is tasked with this duty alone, the assigned agent will
expend a certain amount of effort on the task. But if Agents 1 and 2 are given redundant
responsibility, each one may offer less than full effort assuming that the other agent might pick
up the slack. Further, if compensation is available only to the first agent to find the violation, then
each agent in the redundant scenario will account for the reduced probability of compensation
when choosing an effort level.
171. See Ting, supra note 144, at 276. The shirking story assumes a collective-action problem,
but that is not preordained. Continuing the information example, information may be exogenous
or differentially available. If the violation directly affects an individual, we would not suggest that
this information was the product of her effort nor would we worry about other agents changing
behavior in response. Shirking also is reduced if agents explicitly or implicitly coordinated,
dividing the information space between them.
172. See infra notes 195–196.
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shirking actually hurts the principal’s interest.173 Particularly when a
principal is saddled with an unreliable agent, the addition of a
redundant enforcer can improve outcomes despite the risk of shirking.
Third, the shirking problem assumes that the relevant pieces of
information are substitutes, e.g., both agents are seeking to identify a
single violation of law.174 But sometimes the relevant data will be
complements, e.g., two pieces of information gain additional value when
put together. In this circumstance, the incentive to gather each piece of
information is increased rather than decreased.175
A second strategic problem is cue taking. Nominally
independent agents may change their behavior to mirror another
agent’s actions, thus reducing the reliability enhancing features of
redundant components. This, too, is a potential concern for redundant
enforcement.176 Here again, however, the political-science literature
offers further clarity. First, interdependence can be avoided if agents
are unaware of each other’s activities or are incentivized to ignore
them.177 Indeed, the second agent may have the incentive to focus on
exactly the areas that the first agent’s biases cause it to miss. Second,
if the first agent is more reliable than the second, then the literature
suggests that cue taking by the second, less reliable agent might be
preferred—the less reliable agent does better when following the more
reliable agent’s lead.178 And, if the cue giver knows about the cue-taking
behavior, then it can intentionally signal to the second agent to take
actions that, for various reasons, the first agent prefers to hand off. For
example, a resource strapped first agent can shift some of its burden to
a less reliable second agent by cueing the work to be done.179 Last, with
respect to either shirking or cue taking, strategic behavior can be
understood as a cost, and sometimes that cost is worth paying in order
to achieve the benefits of redundancy described above.
The foregoing analysis suggests the following principles for
structuring redundant-enforcement regimes:

173. See Ting, supra note 144, at 283–85.
174. See Stephenson, supra note 41, at 110–12.
175. See Ting, supra note 144, at 284–85.
176. One classic example of cue taking is that voters may make decisions about ballot
initiatives based on the cues of interest groups and high profile individuals. See, e.g., Arthur Lupia,
Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform
Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 63–76 (1994).
177. In other words, we can manipulate the system through incentives to return it to a state
of independence.
178. See HEIMANN, supra note 144, at 94–97.
179. One could imagine, for example, that more routine tasks can be delegated to the less
reliable agent. Cf. HEIMANN, supra note 144, at 125 (discussing programmatic functions).
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1. Redundancy creates direct costs and risks over-enforcement.
(Many critics stop here.)
2. However, redundancy may be a response to under-enforcement
resulting from errors, resource constraints, information
problems, and agency costs if agents are sufficiently
differentiated. (This is the “engineering” claim.)
3. Shirking may reduce redundancy’s effectiveness, though this
concern is mitigated if the first agent is unreliable or if effort is
complementary. Cue taking may reduce redundancy’s
effectiveness, though this concern is mitigated if the first agent
is reliable or if incentives are properly constructed to manage
independence. (These are the strategic behavior considerations.)
By failing to move beyond the first principle, critics of redundancy miss
the potential of multiple diverse agents to improve law enforcement. In
addition to potential cost-mitigation devices,180 the “engineering” claim
suggests that redundancy may respond to many causes of underenforcement as long as agents are diverse, and public and private
agents differ along meaningful dimensions.181 The balance of this Part
applies this general case for diverse-agent redundancy to problems with
case selection and case outcomes. That said, the strategic behavior
concerns give some pause. Although this paper is not the forum for the
fine-grained assessment necessary to apply those insights to specific
areas, where relevant this Article will suggest how strategic behavior
may affect the analysis under particular conditions.
B. Redundant Authority and Case Selection
As described above, under-enforcement may result from errors,
resource constraints, information and perspectives, or agency costs.
These issues can manifest in problems with case selection—agents may
fail to bring cases they should. Or they may result in problems with case
outcomes—settlements or judgments may understate the appropriate
recovery. Potential responses differ depending on whether the problem
is one of case selection or case outcomes.182 This Section considers case
selection, leaving case outcomes to Section C.183
180. See supra notes 144–145.
181. See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text.
182. Undifferentiated opposition to redundancy fails to appreciate this important distinction.
See supra notes 144–147.
183. This Section thus assumes that once a case is selected by a public or private enforcer, the
legislature is comfortable with potential outcomes. Why might a legislature worry about case
selection and not case outcomes? Perhaps the legislature believes it is well positioned to monitor
case prosecution, but lacks information necessary to monitor case selection. Or perhaps agent
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The basic claim of this Section is that redundant authority,
described as the ability of public and private agents to bring
overlapping but mutually preclusive claims, responds to problems with
case selection. Redundant authority may be valuable in these
circumstances because it helps with errors, resources, information, and
agency costs while avoiding the direct costs of truly redundant
litigation. The notion that redundant authority may reduce underselection of cases is not novel—indeed, the private-enforcement
revolution assumed benefits from redundant authority.184 However, it
is useful to articulate the logic of redundant authority both to see its
scope and to identify the procedural rules that should structure its use.
First, some cases may go unselected because of random or nonrandom errors. In some circumstances the lawmaker may be able to
improve enforcement without redundancy by targeting agent
incentives—providing bounties,185 increasing the attorney fee,186 or
raising the political profile of an issue often will be sufficient.187 But in
some circumstances the legislature will be unable to tailor the
incentives to satisfy public or private attorneys.188 In those situations,
the engineering version of redundancy suggests that redundant
authority should reduce under-enforcement through diversification.189
Because case selection is the issue here, redundant authority should be
combined with preclusion to avoid costly (and unnecessary) relitigation.
Note also that preclusion obviates the cue-taking problem because once
a case is selected, there is no cue to take.190
Second, non-selection of cases may result from resource
constraints. Because public and private enforcers draw on different
resource pools, redundant authority should mitigate this underselection by increasing available resources, as compared with public or

incentives differ with respect to case selection and prosecution such that under-selection is likely
but under-performance in litigation is not.
184. See supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text (collecting examples).
185. See, e.g., supra note 53 (citing False Claims Act recovery provisions).
186. See generally, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 41 (collecting examples).
187. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (public and private preferences). But see
Lemos & Minzner, supra note 152 (discussing public-enforcement incentives).
188. For example, Professor Weisbach noted that legislatures are disabled from using highpowered incentives for government attorneys. See Weisbach, supra note 150, at 1847–48. For
profit-motivated parties, due-process caps as well as available remedial metrics may limit
potential recoveries. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (limiting
punitive damages). Defendant’s ability to pay also may blunt private incentives.
189. Random errors are avoided by repetition; bias is counteracted by multiple diverse agents
(with diverse biases). See supra notes 144–145.
190. See supra notes 176–179.
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private authority alone.191 Indeed, existing redundant-authority
regimes are often justified on this basis.192 For example, the SEC has
acknowledged that private enforcement provides a necessary
supplement to public securities enforcement.193 Notably, although
redundant authority may increase resources, converting redundant
authority to redundant litigation may be counterproductive on this
score—duplication will sap already scarce enforcement resources. For
this reason, inter-party preclusion is particularly important in these
cases.194
Information presents a third challenge to case selection, and
again redundant authority may be helpful while redundant litigation
may go too far. The potential information challenge is
straightforward—the party who can most efficiently prosecute the case
may not know that it exists (or that it is cost effective). Redundancy,
properly constructed, responds to this information problem: redundant
authority permits either agent to file a case, claims-processing rules
publicize and allocate cases, and preclusion stems over-selection. In
light of the potential for shirking, these regimes are particularly apt
when agents have differential access to information, reducing
incentives to shirk and increasing the possibility of complementary
efforts.195 Whistleblower regimes also may be employed to solve
information problems, though redundant authority may be preferred

191. This assumes that resources are exogenous, at least for public actors, if not for private
ones as well. The exogeneity of resources mitigates the shirking problem. See supra note 155.
192. See supra notes 92–94 (defining preclusion to include any rule that cuts off redundant
litigation).
193. See supra note 156 (citing testimony of Chairman Levitt). Similarly, according to Roach
and Trebilcock, when Congress first adopted private rights of action for antitrust violations, the
appropriation for federal antitrust enforcement was zero. See Krent Roach & Michael J. Trebilcock,
Private Enforcement of Competition Laws, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 461, 465 (1996). That said, the
government did prosecute a small number of antitrust cases in the early years of the Sherman Act.
See Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366
(1970).
194. But see supra notes 96–97 (discussing examples of non-preclusion). Further, because the
target is limited resources, claims-processing rules in these regimes should allocate cases between
public and private enforcers with an emphasis on opportunity costs. For example, Congress might
give private parties first priority, assuming that public resources should be reserved for cases that
lack a private option.
195. If Agent 1 knows that Agent 2 cannot access information (or cannot gather it at a
reasonable cost), then Agent 1 should not alter its behavior because of Agent 2. See supra notes
159–161. Similarly, intangible resources often are complementary, for example private
information about harms and expertise at prosecuting them. See supra note 162.
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because it incentivizes parties to bring cases,196 and it insures against
non-selection by the other agent.197
One potential example of this approach is the notice-andintervention scheme of environmental statutes.198 Private parties may
have better information than the EPA about where and when
environmental violations occur.199 As a result, private parties are
permitted to bring citizen suits.200 But, Congress has indicated a
preference for government enforcement: a claims-processing rule
requires the private party to give notice to the government, and the
government has the option to intervene and preclude private action.201
If the government does not intervene, however, private litigation
provides insurance against the government’s non-selection.202
Agency costs are a final explanation for selection problems. For
example, a government agency may be the most efficient enforcer, but
because of capture, it would prefer not to prosecute an offending
insider.203 However, if case selection decisions were easy to monitor,
then, in some of these situations, the agency will prefer to prosecute the
suit itself. Redundant authority thus responds to agency problems by

196. Although whistleblower regimes also could include incentives, the private-enforcement
model represents an existing tool to incentivize private parties (damages) and attorneys (fees). Cf.
Huq, supra note 144 (discussing cost mitigation resulting from the use of existing institutions).
And litigation has the added benefit of deterring some bad cases, as the costs of filing suit and the
threat of sanctions (or worse) may act as a screening mechanism for misleading or false allegations.
See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of Qui Tam,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1189–98 (2014). Litigation may have other advantages as well. For
example, litigation may smooth the information-sharing process, either because courts can endorse
(and enforce) protective orders among parties, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c), or because courts can
require information sharing even when parties are otherwise reluctant. E.g., id. 37. At the same
time, civil litigation is replete with claims-processing procedures that can be used to ensure the
priority enforcer litigates first. See supra Section I.C.
197. See infra note 202.
198. See supra notes 50–53 and accompany text (discussing citizen suits).
199. Most obviously, a direct victim of an environmental violation may be the first to learn of
it, and indeed citizen-suit plaintiffs must show an “injury in fact” to have standing. See, e.g., Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–78 (1992). “Original sources” of information are
prioritized in False Claims Act cases as well. See infra note 208. Note that this situation also tracks
the observation that redundant authority is particularly helpful when agents have different access
to information. See supra note 159.
200. See supra notes 50–53 (discussing citizen suits).
201. See supra notes 134–135 (citing intervention and preclusion provisions). Perhaps this
preference responds to the EPA’s prosecutorial expertise. And, indeed, it may be that private
information and government expertise are complementary. See supra notes 102–106.
202. For example, if the EPA declined to prosecute due to bias, resources, or agency costs, the
backstop of private enforcement does the job.
203. This is an extreme version of Professor Cover’s concern with ideological commitments.
See Cover, supra note 149, at 679.
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announcing good cases to agents and principals.204 And, because agents
are in competition, these effects should feed back on selection decisions
and (again because of competition) should be less susceptible to
shirking and cue taking.205
The qui tam mechanism in the False Claims Act may track these
informational and agency-costs stories.206 Sometimes the government
will have the information and the will to prosecute, and in those cases
the government may bring an enforcement action that precludes
further private efforts.207 In other cases, government agents may not be
aware of the fraud or may be complicit in it, so private parties may
initiate suits.208 Public enforcers, well versed in government litigation,
may intervene once the case is announced by the private enforcer.209
Duplicative litigation in either case is avoided as public and private
suits are mutually preclusive.210
To summarize, redundant authority may improve case selection
by reducing errors, aggregating resources and information, and
improving monitoring. This logic supports redundant authority but not
redundant litigation. Preclusion should bar duplicative suits in these
circumstances, and claims-processing rules should be targeted to the
particular challenges in the regulated area. Cue taking is not a
significant issue here, while the risk of shirking points to certain
circumstances particularly well-suited for redundant authority.

204. Professor Stephenson argued that executive agencies should determine when to allow
private rights of action. See Stephenson, supra note 41, at 95. But his proposal is susceptible to an
agency-capture critique. Legislative, judicial, or market-based approaches reduce the effect of
agency capture because the public enforcer is cooperating or competing with the private enforcer
in the light of day.
205. See supra notes 176–179. Redundant authority may improve enforcement efficiency as
well. Agents may select weak cases if they are unaware of strong cases—an information problem.
Or, they may take weak cases to hide strong cases that they would rather not prosecute—an agency
problem. Redundant authority can improve case-selection efficacy by publicizing strong cases and
reducing monitoring costs.
206. See supra notes 51–53. The False Claims Act also might respond to resource constraints,
as the government may not be able to prosecute all of the fraud against it.
207. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2012).
208. Id. § 3730(b)(1). Indeed, private suits must provide non-public information—the relator
must satisfy the “public-disclosure bar” or be an “original source.” Id. § 3730(e)(4). This might be
seen as cue giving from the more reliable agent. See supra notes 176–179.
209. Id. § 3730(b)(2) & (c).
210. See supra note 94. Private incentives are maintained independent of the government’s
intervention decision. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012) (providing award of fifteen to twenty-five percent
if the government intervenes, or twenty-five to thirty percent if the government does not).
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C. Redundant Litigation and Case Outcomes
Because redundant authority avoids much of the waste and
over-enforcement risk that comes from truly redundant litigation, the
case for redundant authority may seem straightforward. In many
circumstances, diversifying potential enforcers has positive
consequences for enforcement levels, while the costs of this
redundancy—though not nonexistent—are much lower. Therefore, it
may not be surprising that redundant authority is a relatively common
regulatory strategy, and that its adoption is open and notorious.211
The costs are clearly higher in redundant litigation. Two
lawsuits are more costly than one, and the risks of over-enforcement
are higher when plaintiffs get two bites at the apple. Therefore, it may
not be surprising that redundant litigation is more frequently the
subject of criticism, and that its uses documented in Part I are perhaps
less obvious to outside observers. Indeed, a default preference against
redundant litigation would not be unjustified.
And yet, if lawmakers are concerned with settlements and
judgments that understate the appropriate level of enforcement,
redundant authority is insufficient.212 Denying inter-party preclusion
may remedy and deter under-enforcement in case outcomes, and
damages and claims-processing rules can minimize some costs of overenforcement and waste, though again these costs remain an important
consideration for enforcement design. The balance of this Section
unpacks these ideas, moving stepwise through the procedural decisions
that manage redundant litigation: (1) preclusion; (2) damages; and (3)
claims processing.213
Before delving into this analysis, though, there is one
explanation for redundant litigation that should be mentioned. Perhaps
the easiest case for redundant litigation exists when the lawmaker
211. Environmental citizen suits, for example, should not surprise most observers of
environmental law.
212. This Section addresses situations in which the first case results in a payout that may be
too low. A special case of the model would be situations in which the first case results in a payout
of zero—i.e., a finding of no liability. My argument applies in this special case as well, though a
legislature might be particularly wary of over-enforcement and defendant litigation costs in these
situations, thus auguring more strongly in favor of the contingent delegation discussed infra note
249.
213. Of course, problems with case outcomes also could suggest non-litigation alternatives,
and indeed Professors Cox and Thomas have recently explored how changes in corporate
governance have responded to ineffectiveness and inefficiency in litigation aiming to rein in
managerial agency costs. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Addressing Agency Costs Through
Private Litigation in the U.S: Tensions, Disappointments, and Substitutes (Vanderbilt Law &
Econ., Research Paper No. 15-20, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2651863 [http://perma.cc/
5WCL-GM44].
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accepts the risk of over-enforcement in service of reducing underenforcement.214 It may be that for certain conduct, the lawmaker is so
intent on punishment and deterrence that it tolerates overenforcement.215 Or it may be that the lawmaker assumes (rightly or
wrongly) that agents will self-censor over-enforcement.216 Either way, if
the goal is a reduction in under-enforcement no matter the cost—and
as long as constitutional protections are in place217—then the
legislature could authorize redundant litigation purely as insurance
against false negatives. However, concerns with over-enforcement are
relevant,218 and “multiple punishments” should not be the norm.219 For
these reasons, the balance of this Section assumes that lawmakers are
not unconcerned with over-enforcement.220
1. Preclusion: Redundant Authority v. Redundant Litigation
Case outcomes may be insufficient for many of the same reasons
that good cases may not be selected. Agents may make random errors
or biased ones. Resource constraints may reduce the effectiveness of
enforcement operations. Information gaps may lead enforcers to
underperform at settlement or judgment. And agency problems may
result in sham suits or suboptimal settlements.

214. Bendor, for example, suggests that the justification for redundancy is stronger “the more
critical or costly a failure would be.” BENDOR, supra note 144, at 53.
215. For two sources discussing but not endorsing this notion, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008) (discussing
constitutional rights); and Huq, supra note 144 (discussing terrorism).
216. Perhaps agents are so concerned with legislative approval—and legislatures are so
transparent about their concern with over-enforcement—that the risk is small. Or perhaps the
legislature concludes that norms sufficiently discourage duplicative suits.
217. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., amend. VIII (Excessive Fines Clause); Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (limiting permissible punitive damages).
218. Cf. infra notes 294–295 and accompanying text (discussing Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010)).
219. See infra note 250 (citing sources on multiple punishments).
220. Although the lawmaker may not want to encourage over-enforcement, presumably most
laws are designed to be enforced once. For example, a statutory or common-law claim for
compensatory damages seeks to make the victim whole. One might say that there are statutory
schemes for which under-enforcement is preferred, for example, speed limits, but recall that this
Article judges enforcement against legislative preference, so those cases merely suggest a different
baseline. See supra text accompanying notes 147–148. Admittedly, there may be circumstances in
which some legislators desire no enforcement of a law on the books. In the context of aggregation,
Professor Burbank suggested that “it seems entirely possible that—prior to the introduction of the
small claims class action—a legislature may be been aware, and (collectively) content, that in some
circumstances the right and its attendant statutory remedy were worth only the paper on which
they were written.” Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of
Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1929 (2006). This Article does not make any
assumptions about the intended level of enforcement, only that it is nonzero.
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Redundant authority does not respond to problems with case
outcomes, but redundant litigation might. The mechanism is direct:
remove preclusion.221 If a private suit understates recovery, then a
second (non-precluded) public suit is available to remedy the underenforcement; if a public suit is insufficient, a second (non-precluded)
private suit could fill the gap.222 The second litigation also aggregates
information exposed in the first case with new information from the
redundant agent—efforts may be complementary.223 And, by improving
monitoring through competition and publicity, redundant suits curtail
agency problems.224 The threat of redundant litigation also should feed
back into improved outcomes in the first case, and thus may reduce the
amount of redundant litigation that actually occurs.225 Though
redundant litigation has direct costs, a legislature may elect to pay
these costs in order to remedy and deter under-enforcement in case
outcomes.226
Why would a legislature select redundant litigation when it
could just select the better enforcer? One set of answers is that the
better enforcer cannot be stretched to cover all cases. Most clearly, the
better enforcer may be hard capped by resource constraints—states
with balanced-budget requirements, for example, can only increase
public-enforcement spending so much. This fixed constraint has
parallels in other areas—e.g., there may be something about the better
agent that makes it impossible (or impractical) to overcome a particular
bias or information problem. In these circumstances, redundant
litigation may provide a backstop for under-enforcing outcomes.227
Perhaps a more interesting set of answers tracks the earlier
observation that redundancy is particularly effective when the principal

221. Of course, preclusion has its own set of purposes and values. See, e.g., Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 717, 790–95 (2005). This discussion
treats “preclusion” as a tool of institutional design, but in practice lawmakers may account for
preclusion’s values along with enforcement concerns when crafting a set of regulatory approaches.
222. Non-preclusion may reduce defendants’ incentives to settle. Because remedies are
critical to this analysis, this issue is taken up in the discussion of damages below.
223. In this way, concern with shirking may be mitigated. See supra notes 176–179.
224. Publicity is relevant not only to inform legislators about agent performance, but also to
inform voters about legislative performance.
225. This is a positive type of strategic behavior. See supra text accompanying notes 168–181.
226. Moreover, note that many of the costs of litigation do not need to be duplicated. For
example, the costs of preservation and discovery may not be incurred twice. And, as it turns out,
these costs seem to represent the largest share of defendants’ litigation costs. See, e.g., William
H.J. Hubbard, The Discovery Sombrero, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 867, 885–97 (2015). Costs also are
mitigated by the capacity for litigation among private parties, public enforcers, and the courts. See
generally Huq, supra note 144 (discussing a related issue).
227. See supra Section III.A.
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is saddled with an unreliable enforcer.228 In those cases, allowing a
second agent to sue may fill the gap. For example, for claims that have
some “private” character—e.g., torts—a legislature may be unwilling or
unable to eliminate private enforcement.229 And yet, for various
reasons, private actions may be systematically suboptimal. Thus,
redundant government litigation may be necessary to achieve socially
optimal outcomes.
Consider the case of private mass litigation. Suboptimal
settlements are a notorious concern in class actions. The notion is that
plaintiffs’ attorneys have incentives to settle cases too easily, plaintiffs
themselves are poor monitors because individual stakes are low and
information is expensive, and courts supervising litigation are
handicapped because they only have information presented to them by
the parties.230 This problem is magnified in the context of dueling class
actions.231 If class actions are filed in different jurisdictions,232
defendants can hold a reverse auction among plaintiffs’ attorneys,
bidding them down to lower and lower settlements.233 Each class
counsel is willing to negotiate because she wants her fee, and full-faithand-credit rules mean that any judicially endorsed settlement may be
preclusive in other U.S. courts.234 But if the private settlement were not
preclusive on government suits, then redundant public litigation could
improve the outcome and mitigate the reverse-auction problem. The

228. See supra Section III.A.
229. See supra notes 31–40 (discussing private causes of action). Non-tort claims may also
have a personal connection. A district court recently certified an antitrust class action on behalf of
women who donated eggs through fertility clinics and donation agencies. Kamakahi v. Am. Soc.
Reproductive Med., 305 F.R.D. 164 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015). “Private” claims also may include
those for which the private party has a nonpecuniary interest. For further discussion of the
implications of these values for redundant enforcement, see infra notes 289–291.
230. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1356–67 (1995) (discussing these issues); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While
the Widows Weep: Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1115–19 (1995)
(discussing difficulties with court review); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1111–12 (1996) (discussing plaintiffs’ attorneys’ incentives to
settle).
231. See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 470–74 (2000)
(discussing the pressures of class actions).
232. One conceivably could get the same effect within a jurisdiction if the cases are not
consolidated and are not treated as res judicata.
233. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of
Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 853 (1995) (discussing the problem of allowing defendants to
choose among plaintiffs’ attorneys); Wasserman, supra note 231, at 473 (laying out this scenario).
234. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2015) (full
faith and credit statute); see also supra note 106 (collecting sources).
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threat of a redundant suit also may have a disciplining effect on the
original settlement.235
A number of recent developments in complex-dispute resolution
may call out for redundant public enforcement of this type. Private
entities (like BP after Deep Water Horizon) have employed so-called
“corporate settlement mills” to privately resolve disputes and procure
litigation waivers without resorting to the legal process.236 In a novel
settlement, parties to a class action applied mandatory class procedures
to an agreement waiving the right to future class relief, while leaving
open the possibility of future individual suits.237 Arbitration is another
potential cause for concern, as enforceable class-arbitration waivers
have drawn skepticism from many judges and scholars.238 In each of
these circumstances, a legislature may not object to the practice in
theory, but may worry about its effect on case outcomes. Instead of an
outright ban, a legislature could adopt non-preclusion to remedy or
deter any under-enforcing outcomes that may result.239 Indeed, despite
justified criticism on other grounds, the Class Action Fairness Act

235. Allowing serial private suits is another possible response, and indeed this was the state
of affairs with respect to damages class actions prior to 1966. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1938 (1998) (discussing the practice of allowing joinder after a favorable
judgment had been reached on the merits). But such an approach risks over-enforcement, cf.
Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV.
281, 289 (1957) (arguing that allowing res judicata leads to aberrant results), and reduced
incentives to settle. See supra notes 221–224.
236. See Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L.
REV. 129, 178–88 (describing settlement mills). Remus and Zimmerman propose regulation,
judicial scrutiny, participation, and ethical standards, but another response would be permitting
redundant government litigation.
237. See D. Theodore Rave, When Peace Is Not the Goal of a Class Action Settlement, 50 GA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (citing In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 741 F.3d 811 (7th Cir.
2014)). Using the mandatory aggregation procedure of Rule 23(b)(1)(A), the District Court
approved a settlement agreement under which defendant offered some relief in exchange for
waivers of the right to proceed in an “aggregated action.” In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig.,
741 F.3d 811, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2014). The agreement did not seem to bar parens patriae actions on
the same claims. See id. at 818–19.
238. E.g., Einer Elhauge, How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Replacing
It with Ineffective Forms of Arbitration, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 771, 775 (2015) (discussing how
arbitration clauses “waive the right to effective vindication of antitrust law); Judith Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure
of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2836–40 (2015) (discussing how arbitration agreements interfere
with private rights); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion,
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 118–22 (2011) (discussing the
unfairness of boilerplate arbitration agreements).
239. This proposal would be particularly effective if combined with a setoff rule, such that the
threat of relitigation would deter the most egregious versions of these practices but not deter their
use entirely. See infra Section III.C.2.
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requires notice to state and federal officials of class-action settlements,
potentially inviting real or threatened redundant litigation.240
Still another version of this account of redundant litigation
addresses situations in which reliability varies across cases. Imagine a
government agency that is a reasonably reliable enforcer except that it
occasionally settles suboptimally with political allies (or as a result of
some other nonrandom bias). On this set of facts, the lawmaker is—in
a sense—saddled with an unreliable enforcer for those few cases if it
wants to preserve the reliable enforcer for all other cases.241 Redundant
litigation can be available for these suboptimal outcomes,242 and the
threat of redundant litigation—and its ability to publicize and
substantiate those suboptimal outcomes—may have a feedback effect
on the agency’s behavior.243
Finally, redundant litigation could target cases based on
disposition type. Specifically, a legislature may think differently about
the reliability of settlements versus judgments. As noted above, underenforcing settlements are a significant problem in class actions. There
also are good reasons to be concerned about public settlements that cut
off further investigation.244 These concerns may support a nonpreclusion rule for settlements. Agency problems seem less severe in
cases litigated to judgment. Courts actively supervise litigants and
attorneys, opportunities to collude are reduced, and the public nature
of judicial proceedings compared with settlements should create some
sunlight-as-disinfectant effects.245 Under-enforcing judgments may be
a problem, but it would not be unreasonable for a legislature to be less
concerned than when cases settle.246 Therefore, settlements could be
240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2012) (rules on notice for class actions); Sharkey, supra note 130,
at 1994–96 (discussing notice and state attorneys general).
241. This assumes that the lawmaker cannot identify these cases ex ante and legislate
accordingly. For example, if we knew that the EPA had a problem with clean water cases, we could
strip its jurisdiction in that area only.
242. See supra note 100 (discussing “diligent prosecution” requirements).
243. Of course, reliability may vary between public and private agents, and there are practical
and democratic-theory differences between public and private enforcers. See, e.g., Engstrom, supra
note 138, at 630–41 (discussing critiques of private enforcement); Stephenson, Public Regulation,
supra note 41, at 106–21 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of private enforcement). For
these reasons, legislatures may adopt asymmetric preclusion rules. See supra notes 207–210
(collecting statutes with asymmetric preclusion). For example, if a legislature concluded that
public enforcement was more reliable, government outcomes could preclude private litigants
asymmetrically. Less drastically, relative preclusion could vary depending on party order—e.g., it
is harder, but not impossible, to relitigate a government case.
244. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 9, at 902–05 (discussing criticisms of EPA intervention).
245. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (judicial supervision of class-action representation).
246. One potentially relevant consideration is that redundancy might affect fact-finder
behavior—it might increase errors in favor of defendants or discourage investment of judicial
resources in light of the potential backstop. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE
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denied preclusive effect while relitigation of judgments would only be
permitted if a high bar is cleared.247
This differentiation between the preclusive effect of settlements
and judgments reflects what might be called contingent delegation. If
an agent is willing to litigate cases, incur those costs, and subject itself
to the scrutiny of the judicial process, then the lawmaker devolves
significant authority. The litigating agent has full control unless its
performance is so poor that it is susceptible to a collateral attack. If
parties settle cases, however, the delegation is weaker—no preclusion
attaches. The relative strength of the contingent delegation (i.e., the
relative strength of preclusion) is at the discretion of the legislature. 248
Redundant enforcement also may reveal information about public and
private enforcers that informs future contingent delegations. And
perhaps, at least under some conditions, the lack of preclusion
associated with settlements may deter some plaintiffs bringing suit
exclusively for the purpose of extracting nuisance settlements.249
2. Damages: Multiple Punishments and Incentives
This Section makes a simple claim—damages in redundant
litigation should offset to reduce over-enforcement—and then considers
various implications of this proposal.

L.J. 470, 517–19 (2011) (showing how second-round review affects judicial behavior in the first
case); David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class
Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1904–05 (2002) (discussing adjudicative investment
as a function of stakes). Exactly how these effects may play out in redundant enforcement is not
clear, and the presence of government actors may complicate matters further. These effects thus
deserve further study.
247. Cf. Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class
Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 771–73 (1998) (discussing
collateral attack on judgments for inadequacy of representation); Lemos, supra note 22, at 532–35
(discussing class actions and parens patriae suits); William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action
Litigation: Lessons from Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 790, 820–41 (2007) (discussing habeas cases
and class actions). Writing about public suits vindicating private claims, Professor Lemos rejected
preclusion in favor of offset or opt-in. Lemos, supra note 22, at 546–48. Lemos’s arguments
apparently apply to settlements and judgments, but the logic described here suggests that
judgments could be treated more respectfully (and more preclusively) than settlements.
248. Potential standards could include rules borrowed from legal malpractice, Gunn v.
Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013), ineffective assistance of counsel in habeas cases, Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), or inadequate representation in class-action
jurisprudence, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 395–99 (1996) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also supra note 130 (collecting sources).
249. Though fleshing out this notion is beyond the scope of this project, the logic may be as
follows: Contingent delegation reduces the value of settlement, and thus defendants may be less
willing to pay out a nuisance settlement in lieu of litigating their case to judgment. If a rational
plaintiff knows that no nuisance settlement is coming, that might deter some suits seeking only
this result.
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As explained above, legislatures may be justified in turning to
redundant public-private litigation to reduce under-enforcement in case
outcomes. Adopting a non-preclusion rule, however, risks overenforcement in the form of multiple recoveries. If both private and
public enforcers can sue on the same offense, defendants could easily
pay twice. This is the “multiple-punishments problem.”250 A direct
solution is to require that damages in the second case be offset by the
value of the first recovery. That way, a defendant should never pay more
than full value. In practice, pairing offset with non-preclusion is
common in public-private litigation, though it is not the universal rule,
and the lack of offsets in some areas should raise red flags.251
Note that this seemingly straightforward rejection of multiple
damages has implications for alternative strategies to remedy underenforcement in case outcomes. One potential response to underenforcing outcomes would be to multiply damages—if parties routinely
accept one half of the optimum, a legislature could prescribe double
damages and save the cost of a second suit.252 The multiplepunishments problem highlights reasons we may favor redundant
litigation over damage multipliers. First, although a damage multiplier
might on average result in optimum recovery, in any given case a
defendant might pay too much. For fairness reasons, these multiple
punishments may be disfavored.253 The risk of multiple damages also
may disproportionately affect risk-averse parties, while they will be

250. For discussion on the multiple-punishments problem, see generally Thomas B. Colby,
Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual,
Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003); Howard A. Denemark, Seeking Greater Fairness
when Awarding Multiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act by a Defendant, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 931 (2002); Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a National
Punitive Damages Registry, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1613 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass
Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925 (2002);
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003). See also
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840–41 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.). Although
this literature focuses on punitive damages, the same multiple-punishments problem could result
for overlapping suits by different plaintiffs, for example redundant suits seeking disgorgement of
ill-gotten gains from a defendant. I should note, however, that this discussion is defendant focused.
For the plaintiffs’ perspective, see supra note 188 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 115–116 (collecting examples in securities, antitrust, and ERISA). In
many areas, public and private damages are described differently—e.g., private litigants may be
able to recover punitive damages while public litigants recover civil penalties. The mere recharacterization of damages theories should not interfere with the offset regime. Only if damages
truly seek different ends, should offset be reconsidered.
252. This is obviously an oversimplification, as one would expect dynamic effects resulting
from a damage multiplier that may require a different ratio. However, the logic of this discussion
holds no matter the proportions.
253. See supra note 250 (collecting sources). Indeed, in some areas, the Supreme Court has
disallowed multiple punishments on constitutional grounds. See supra note 122.
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ineffective against parties with a limited ability to pay.254 Finally,
multiplied damages may not be effective in response to many of the
enforcement problems identified above—a truly captured agency, an
enforcer with a fixed resource constraint, or a case involving difficultto-transfer knowledge may still call out for multiple diverse agents
rather than a multiplier.255
Returning to the main thread, the simple claim that offsets avoid
multiple damages must grapple with the potential consequences for the
likelihood of redundant suits. Redundant litigation options cannot deter
or remedy under-enforcement if they are never cost-effective to exercise.
Offsets thus present an incentive problem: whichever agent goes second
will be pursuing a reduced opportunity for damages, and this reduction
in incentives could result in non-selection or under-investment.256
With respect to government attorneys as redundant enforcers,
the reduction in the purely pecuniary incentives to litigate may be less
troubling. Public attorneys have motives beyond monetary recovery.257
If one subscribes to a budget-maximizing view of public agencies, then
it would make sense for government attorneys to demonstrate the
shortcomings of private enforcement in order to acquire more resources
in the next round of legislation.258 Alternatively, if public attorneys
were public spirited (or public-attention seeking), miscarriages of
justice may call out for action. These same interests also may
discourage public actors from relitigating cases in which prior outcomes
were only slightly suboptimal. It would be hard to imagine a legislature
responding positively to an agency that used valuable resources to
recover a pittance, nor would such a suit maximize the public
interest.259
The incentive problem is more acute when private actors are
redundant enforcers. Private parties seem primarily motivated in these

254. If a party had funds to pay a compensatory award but not a multiplied one, then it would
not experience any greater deterrent effect from the multiplier.
255. See supra Section III.A.
256. Assuming multiple recoveries were disfavored, this is another reason to doubt serial
private litigation as a policy response. See supra note 250.
257. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
258. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 155–
61 (1971) (discussing competition among agencies); Gersen, supra note 144, at 220 (discussing
implications of multiple jurisdiction).
259. See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in
Class Action: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1394 (2000) (discussing the
consequences of asymmetric stakes for accuracy). Of course, the asymmetric stakes between
private plaintiffs and defendants in mass actions are notorious. See Alexandra D. Lahav,
Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494, 1498 (2013) (discussing
asymmetry); Hay & Rosenberg, supra (same).
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cases by profit,260 and private parties necessarily will have reduced
incentives in offset cases as compared with non-offset cases. If the
legislature ranks cases according to potential recovery, then this
reduction in incentives is appropriate—private parties will sue only
when government underperformance is so extensive that it would be
cost justified to bring a redundant suit to recover the remainder. If
lawmakers want the disciplining effect of redundant litigation to reach
beyond those cases, however, then they would need to construct
incentives to encourage follow-on suits. Attorney fees are an obvious
starting point.261 For redundant suits, lawmakers could offer attorney
fees calculated with reference to the pre-offset value.262 To avoid private
attorneys filing nearly frivolous suits in order to rack up attorney
fees,263 the legislature could limit the availability of fees to significant
recoveries.264 One could characterize this proposal as contingent
procurement—the government is procuring substitute representation
only if the private party achieves a certain level of recovery.265
Importantly, though, increasing the incentives to relitigate
comes at a cost to settlement. If settlements are not preclusive, and if
relitigation is likely, defendants may be reluctant to settle in the first
place. The uncertainty of follow-on litigation undercuts the finality of
settlement,266 and defendants may worry about the signal that
settlement sends to future enforcers.267 Lawmakers must be aware of

260. See supra note 152.
261. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 41, at 51–54 (collecting data on fee provisions).
262. For example, if a set of claims were worth $10 million plus a $2 million attorney fee, and
the government settled the parens patriae case for $5 million, a private attorney obtaining $5
million in additional recovery could be entitled to the same $2 million fee. Legislatures may view
this as unfair to defendants and as creating a disincentive for government attorneys to achieve
maximum settlements. A solution to both problems would require defendants to satisfy the
difference in damages and the government to reimburse the attorney fee.
263. See supra note 118 (discussing an antitrust suit seeking zero-dollar recovery in order to
qualify for an attorney-fee award).
264. For example, the attorney may recover only if damages exceed the fee, some multiple of
the fee, or some fixed amount. To avoid inflection points, perhaps the attorney fee should grow in
proportion to the difference between the private result and the offset.
265. If the redundant litigation followed a government judgment, different rules may be
necessary. Perhaps private parties could be required to bring the underlying claim against the
defendant and also argue inadequate representation, or they could have a takings-like claim
against the government agency that failed them. It seems likely that a legislature would reject a
rule in which the government could be liable for the full value of every claim it loses. But it would
not be so unreasonable to provide restitution in those cases in which the government grossly
underperformed.
266. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 199–204 (2003) (discussing implications for the opt-out class).
267. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 655 (2006) (describing signaling in this context).

328

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2:285

this tradeoff when considering redundant litigation.268 That said,
settlement effects should not be overstated. The incentives to settle are
already quite strong,269 and parties settle even if general releases are
not available.270 Moreover, offset provisions should help to reduce
settlement effects because they link the risk of relitigation to the
adequacy of the settlement. Defendants’ incentive to settle will be most
disturbed when settlement values are most troubling from a social
perspective.271
In sum, when adopting redundant public-private litigation,
lawmakers can curtail over-enforcement by offsetting damages in the
redundant case, though incentives may need attention to ensure that
disciplining litigation remains cost effective.272
3. Claims Processing: Order and Timing
The foregoing discussion has assumed sequential enforcement,
but public and private suits may be litigated simultaneously.273
Simultaneous suits risk duplicative work and lose out on beneficial
aggregation. Simultaneous suits also risk shirking, as both agents will
prefer that the other makes costly investments in research. Finally, if
simultaneous litigation creates a race, it may discourage enforcers from
268. For example, lawmakers especially concerned with settlement effects could give
defendants the protection of a fee-shifting provision tied to the redundant recovery.
269. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 410 (2004)
(suggesting that ninety-eight percent of cases settle). Although this ninety-eight percent figure
overstates the case, see, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate
and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 111, 129–35 (2009), there is no doubt that a
substantial number of civil cases settle.
270. Defendants settle antitrust and securities cases with government regulators even in light
of follow-on private suits. And the notorious difficulty of enforcing releases has not deterred
settlements in the vast majority of cases.
271. For this reason, it also should not be unfair to deprive defendants of the preclusive
benefits of an illegitimate first disposition. See supra Section III.C.1.
272. The discussion here has focused on damages cases, but of course enforcement suits may
seek declaratory or injunctive relief. To see that declaratory and injunctive relief should not be
ignored, one need look no further than the classics of public-law litigation. See, e.g., Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976). One simple way to translate this Section’s recommendation
to equity is to adopt its approach to preclusion rules, ignore offset rules (because there are no
damages to offset), and turn directly to claims processing. Another view might be that governments
never should be precluded from pursuing injunctive relief. A middle ground applies the former
recommendation to private claims and the latter to public claims. And in some injunctive cases,
remedies may be additive such that “offset” could apply.
273. The discussion here is simplified in that it assumes one public and one private enforcer.
Of course, federal and state governments also may have overlapping claims, and multiple state
governments may want a piece of the action. This paper takes no position on these questions.
Instead, the focus here is how legislatures may tap public and private enforcers to improve law
enforcement through redundant public-private action.
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sharing information, while encouraging them to cut corners, strike
sweetheart deals, or engage in inefficient gamesmanship.274
Legislatures may respond to these concerns by turning
simultaneous enforcement actions into sequential ones. Claimsprocessing rules have the power to affect litigation timing. The simplest
version is a stay rule: all suits except one are stayed pending its
outcome.275 To ensure that parties and courts are aware of simultaneous
suits, parties could be required to give notice of potentially redundant
litigation.276 Citizen-suit provisions, for example, often call upon private
parties to notify the government.277 Another way to reduce waste is to
limit the time in which overlapping claims can be brought. For example,
private actors could have the option to intervene as co-plaintiffs or to
replace a public enforcer only at the outset of litigation.278 And courts
have various capabilities that can improve coordination between
seemingly separate proceedings.279
Whether the government suit should stay the private suit or vice
versa is an important choice.280 The strategic-behavior considerations
described above are particularly relevant to this claims-processing
issue. Recall that cue taking may be a good thing if the reliable agent
cues the less reliable one.281 The legislature may well conclude that the
government enforcer is more reliable but lacks the resources to
prosecute every case vigorously.282 If the government is allowed to move
first but calibrate its effort, this action can signal to follow-on private
enforcers that further work is necessary. For example, the government
could pursue injunctive relief or liability only, thereby cueing private

274. Cf. Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to
Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 563 (1971) (discussing races). These effects should exist
whether the first suit precludes or offsets the second.
275. Some statutes include stay provisions, see supra notes 128–135, and legislatures could
take advantage of existing judicial tools for managing parallel proceedings.
276. See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text (discussing notice provisions).
277. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. Similar provisions could exist in other
statutory contexts and in either direction. Cf. Lemos, supra note 22, at 545 (proposing notice and
opt-out for private parties in government suits).
278. Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012) (permitting government intervention in False Claims
Act suit within sixty days); 47 U.S.C. § 402 (2012) (permitting any interested party to intervene in
judicial review of FCC decision within 30 days).
279. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.2 (4th ed. 2004) (“Courts routinely order
counsel to disclose, on an ongoing basis past, and pending related cases in state and federal courts
and to report on their status and results.”); Clopton, supra note 15, at 1390 (discussing
coordination in transnational litigation).
280. Particular circumstances also may call for more creative solutions such as auctions or
tournaments. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 150, at 1826–27.
281. See supra notes 176–179.
282. See supra notes 228–229 and accompanying text.
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enforcers to take up damages actions. Indeed, in some areas, a finding
of liability in a government enforcement action is prima facie evidence
of a violation in the follow-on private suit,283 and in others, government
litigation automatically stays the statute of limitations for redundant
private litigation.284 Alternatively, if redundant litigation is only
necessary to cure occasional lapses by the public (or private) enforcer,
then public (or private) suits should go first.285
An additional consideration with respect to party ordering is
compensation. The multiple punishments literature worries about
defendants unfairly paying multiple judgments, but it often ignores the
issue of compensation—which of the many potential plaintiffs collects
the damage award, and why are others barred from recovery?286 In an
offset regime, the party suing first has access to the largest potential
recovery. A legislature allowing government litigation to proceed first
must be comfortable with reducing potential private compensation, or
it must come up with another way to compensate.287 If private litigation
goes first, however, private plaintiffs have an opportunity at full
recovery. This option could be understood as forfeiting further
compensation from the government suit.288
Non-monetary values such as dignity and participation are also
relevant here.289 Though much of this Article is framed in
instrumentalist terms, particularly for “private law” claims, there are
reasons to think that an aggrieved party should have the right to an

283. See supra note 113 (using the Clayton Act as an example).
284. See supra note 275.
285. See supra notes 128–136 and accompanying text (outlining this justification for
redundant litigation).
286. See supra note 250 (collecting sources). Professor Sharkey, a notable objector to this
trend, identified a particularly telling passage from a law-and-economics textbook: “[T]hat the
damages are paid to the plaintiff is, from an economic standpoint, a detail. It is payment by the
defendant that creates incentives for more efficient resource use. The transfer of the money to the
plaintiff affects his wealth but does not affect efficiency or value.” Sharkey, supra note 250, at 370
(quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 78 (1972)). Another response would be
to decouple the award to plaintiff from the payment by defendant. E.g., Rosenberg, supra note 246,
at 1892–96 (discussing this approach).
287. Perhaps intervention is useful here. In many current regimes, intervention cuts off the
second suit, but it also could have consequences for available damages. For example, if a party
intervenes within the designated period, it would be entitled to full compensatory damages; if it
does not, then a future suit would be subject to offset.
288. Even if the prior case took the form of a damages class action, plaintiffs had rights to
receive notice, opt out of litigation, and object to settlement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Certainly the
government would be within its rights to distribute recoveries from the second suit, but such
distributions should not be required.
289. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right
to Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172–73 (discussing dignity, participation,
effectuation, and deterrence values).
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individual day in court seeking full redress from a defendant that did
her wrong.290 These values may suggest that a private party should
have the right to proceed first, particularly for private-law claims. If
private parties have this option and choose to decline or to accept
socially suboptimal results, then government attorneys may be needed
to fill the deterrence gap.291 Indeed, as long as public actions do not
preclude private ones, individuals will retain their right to a day in
court independent of governmental action—and the monetary offset is
less concerning for suits vindicating non-pecuniary interests.
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement faces random errors, biases, resource
constraints, information problems, and agency costs. Lawmakers can
harness multiple diverse agents to help mitigate these concerns if they
sensibly link institutional design to legislative preferences. Of course,
redundant enforcement is not the right approach for all situations and
in all forms. Legislatures must make the underlying judgments about
which pathologies are sufficiently pernicious to justify redundant
enforcement.292 Legislatures have to decide whether to organize
decisions based on enforcement unit or regulated area.293 And
legislatures must set enforcement policy by making choices about
procedural and remedial design.294 These are the hard questions: how
should we weigh the costs and benefits, and how should we structure

290. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (referring to “[o]ur deep-rooted historic
tradition that everyone should have his own day in court”); Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of
Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 967 (1993). For a discussion of the revival of “individual
justice” in private law, see Nathan B. Oman & Jason Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of
Private Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 1119–25 (2013).
291. And because the private party had her chance, the government in the second suit need
not be preoccupied by individual (as opposed to social) goals. Cf. supra notes 286–288 and
accompanying text (making a similar argument regarding compensation).
292. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing, for example, areas in which the
legislature may be willing to accept over-enforcement).
293. One could think of CAFA, as applied in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,
134 S. Ct. 736 (2014), as making a decision based on enforcement unit—state attorneys general
pursuing parens patriae actions are treated differently than class counsel. See supra notes 1–11.
The reliance on citizen-suits in nearly all environmental statutes might be seen as an enforcement
strategy based on the regulated area. See supra notes 43–44 (listing environmental statutes).
294. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 41, at 94–95 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Burbank, et al., supra note 19, at 715 (discussing the Civil Rights Act); Wolff, supra note 221 at
732–38 (discussing the Civil Rights Act and Title VII). See also supra notes 141–143, infra note
295 and accompanying text (discussing Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010)).
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enforcement regimes?295 Rejecting redundancy out of hand, or ignoring
its central role in the modern regulatory state, results in a failure to
grapple with these debates. A better approach acknowledges that
redundant public-private enforcement is part of the enforcement
landscape and thinks more deeply about when and how this strategy
can form a valuable part of a broader regulatory regime.

295. Relatedly, courts should remain sensitive to enforcement priorities reflected in
enforcement design. But there are reasons to be concerned that this is not always the case. Some
have argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady Grove allowed a federal procedural rule
to trump a legislative choice about the scope of private enforcement. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank
& Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 17, 31–32 (2010). Courts also may have flouted legislative choices when they converted oneway preclusion rules in federal civil rights statutes into mutual preclusion rules, see supra notes
67–75 and accompanying text, or when they inferred private causes of action. Readers also may
think that Hood is another example of this phenomenon, as the Court rejected CAFA’s preference
for consolidation in favor of a strict definition of “mass action.” See supra note 4 (describing the
statute). That said, the Hood decision seems consistent with state law, so the outcome may reflect
legislative primacy after all.

